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DESIGNING DUAL-CLASS SUNSETS: THE CASE 
FOR A TRANSFER-CENTERED APPROACH 
MARC T. MOORE*
ABSTRACT
 Dual-class stock (DCS) structures, and their implications for 
managerial accountability and corporate governance more broadly, 
have become prevalent concerns for corporate lawyers and policy-
makers. Recent academic and practitioner debates on DCS have 
tended to focus less on the general merits and drawbacks of DCS 
versus one share/one vote structures, and more on the specific 
common-ground concern as to whether and how such structures 
are subjected to contingent reversal or “sunset”. This Article com-
pares the relative advantages and disadvantages of time-, owner-
ship- and transfer-centered models of DCS sunset provisions. It 
argues in favor of the transfer-centered model on the grounds that: 
(a) its specific event-based trigger renders it less arbitrary in ap-
plication than the time-centered model, and protects against the 
possibility of founders being prevented prematurely from realizing 
their long-term strategic vision (as is a risk with the time-centered 
sunset model); (b) it avoids the moral hazard and other perverse 
controller incentives that are prone to ensue from time-centered sun-
sets; and (c) unlike both the time- and ownership-centered models 
(which are motivated primarily by agency cost concerns), the 
transfer-centered model is sensitive to the powerful non-financial 
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ful to Dennis Amoah, Tim Bowley, Christopher Bruner, Arjun Gopalakrishnan, 
Ayrton Hopkins and Bernie Sharfman for their extremely helpful comments 
on an earlier draft of this Article. Earlier versions of this Article were pre-
sented at corporate law workshops held at UCL Laws and the University of 
Cambridge Law Faculty, in May and June 2019, respectively. I am grateful for 
comments and criticisms received from participants at both those events, and 
especially to Jo Braithwaite, Sam Buell, Ann Sofie Cloots, Charles Elson, El-
eanore Hickman, Sarah Paterson, Martin Petrin, Bobby Reddy, Felix Steffek 
and Simon Witney. The views expressed, together with any outstanding errors, 
are those of the author alone. 
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incentives that controllers typically have to safeguard and promote 
firm value, even where their corporate control rights significantly 
outweigh their corresponding cash flow rights. Accordingly, it sug-
gests that the SEC and principal U.S. exchanges should resist re-
cent calls from influential investor-related bodies to mandate 
time-based sunsets. Instead, domestic policymakers should look 
overseas to Hong Kong and Singapore, whose respective listing au-
thorities have recently introduced transfer-based sunset requirements 
for DCS issuers, in considering the most appropriate blueprint for 
any future regulatory initiatives in this regard. 
2020] DESIGNING DUAL-CLASS SUNSETS 95 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 96 
I. THE PARAMETERS OF THE DUAL-CLASS STOCK (DCS)
DEBATE .................................................................................... 106 
A. Essential Features and Regulatory Treatment of DCS 
Structures ............................................................................ 106 
B. The Polar Extremes of the DCS Debate: Facilitation  
Versus Prohibition .............................................................. 114 
1. The Case for Facilitation ................................................ 114 
2. The Case for Prohibition ................................................. 124 
C. The Shift Towards Sunsets ............................................... 130 
II. THE THREE PRINCIPAL MODELS OF SUNSET PROVISION ......... 134 
A. The Time-Centered Sunset Model ..................................... 134 
B. The Ownership-Centered Sunset Model ............................ 139 
C. The Transfer-Centered Sunset Model ............................... 141 
III. THE CASE IN FAVOR OF THE TRANSFER-CENTERED MODEL .... 145 
A. Lesser Degree of Arbitrariness ........................................... 146 
B. Avoidance of Moral Hazard and Other Perverse Controller 
Incentives ............................................................................. 151 
C. Sensitivity to Non-Financial Controller Motivations ....... 156 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 165 
96 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:093 
INTRODUCTION
 Dual-class stock (DCS) structures have spread exponentially 
in recent years across much of America’s public company commu-
nity.1 Since the turn of the present century, the annual percentage 
of U.S.-listed companies adopting DCS structures has increased 
by a factor of almost twenty in the same number of years.2 Moreover, 
26% of companies that conducted initial public offers (IPOs) on 
U.S. markets in 2019 had DCS structures.3 As a consequence of these 
developments, dual-class listed companies account for an estimated 
total market capitalization of nearly $4 trillion today,4 including 
9% of the S&P 100.5 One leading commentator has described the 
DCS phenomenon as “the most important issue in corporate gov-
ernance today.”6
 Despite their contemporary vogue connotations, DCS struc-
tures are by no means a novelty of today’s hi-tech Silicon Valley 
growth industries.7 Rather, they have been a feature of corporate 
1 See Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Comm’r, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, PERPET-
UAL DUAL-CLASS STOCK: THE CASE AGAINST CORPORATE ROYALTY (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-class-stock-case-against-cor 
porate-royalty [https://perma.cc/W7Q9-MM3W]. 
2 See id.; see also Navanwita Sachdev, Why the Dual-Class Stock Structure 
is Popular with Tech Companies, THE SOCIABLE (Mar. 6, 2019, 11:46 AM), https:// 
sociable.co/business/why-dual-class-stock-structure-popular-tech-companies/ 
[https://perma.cc/A3L2-5F5G]. 
3 COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS., DUAL-CLASS IPO SNAPSHOT: 2017–2019
STATISTICS, https://www.cii.org/files/2019%20Dual%20Class%20Update%2for 
%20Website%20FINAL(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/7JA7-SXPM] [hereinafter CII 
DUAL-CLASS IPO]. 
4 Bernard S. Sharfman, A Private Ordering Defense of a Company’s Right to 
Use Dual Class Share Structures in IPOs, 63 VILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2018). 
5 Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Unequal Voting and the Business 
Judgment Rule, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGUL. (Apr. 7, 
2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/07/unequal-voting-and-the-busi 
ness-judgment-rule/ [https://perma.cc/JN6N-BS8V]; see also David A. Bell, 
Corporate Governance Survey—2018 Proxy Season Results, FENWICK & WEST
LLP (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.fenwick.com/publications/pages/corporate-gover 
nance-survey-2018-proxy-season-results.aspx [https://perma.cc/7TZV-BR7K]. 
6 John C. Coffee, Jr., Dual Class Stock: The Shades of Sunset, COLUM. L.
SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 19, 2018), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018 
/11/19/dual-class-stock-the-shades-of-sunset/ [https://perma.cc/4FP2-263R]. 
7 As one leading commentator has recorded, “one share–one vote is not the 
historical norm” but rather, “[t]o the contrary, limitations on shareholder voting 
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governance, in the United States at least, since the late nine-
teenth century.8 For much of this time, DCS structures have been 
either largely prohibited or, conversely, regarded in a fairly benign 
light,9 if not ignored outright as a seemingly dull and technical 
aspect of corporate finance.10 Initially, concern for controller un-
accountability to investors prompted the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) to prohibit nonvoting stock entirely in 1926 and, after 
1940, to insist on one-vote-per-share as a mandatory U.S. listing 
condition.11 These requirements persisted until the mid-1980s, 
when competitive considerations with respect to the market for 
listings eventually prompted the main U.S. exchanges to adopt a 
more permissive regulatory stance on the matter.12
 For the remainder of the twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries, dual-class and other multi-vote capital structures re-
mained a fairly peripheral and uncontroversial element of the 
rights in fact are as old as the corporate form itself” such that “[t]oday’s dual 
class capital structures thus were almost more of a revival of the historical 
norm than a departure from it.” Stephen M. Bainbridge, Understanding Dual Class 




8 See Sharfman, supra note 4, at 8. For a more thorough historical overview 
of the development and regulatory treatment of DCSs in the United States through-
out the past century, see Samuel L. Hayes et al., Dual Class Share Companies,
Background Note 9-306-032 HARV. BUS. SCH., 1–3 (Aug. 8, 2005), https://www 
.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=32631 [https://perma.cc/D4DS-4Q3P]. 
9 In particular, DCS structures have traditionally been (and, to a large ex-
tent, remain) popular in certain media industries, purportedly as a means of 
safeguarding long-term journalistic independence and integrity in the face of 
potential outside-investor demands for short-term profit maximization. See Jill 
E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Problem of Sunsets, 99 B.U. L. REV.
1057, 1061, 1066–67 (2019). 
10 According to one commentator, “[n]ot long ago, even simple dual-class capital 
structures were the anachronistic refuge of either media conglomerates or old-
style industrial titans,” with media companies in particular having traditionally 
deployed dual-class voting structures “when the requirements for journalistic 
integrity and independence from the market demanded a safe-harbor fortified by 
an impregnable curtain of voting control.” Elson & Ferrere, supra note 5. 
11 See Sharfman, supra note 4, at 8. 
12 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual 
Dual Class Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 596 (2017). 
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corporate landscape,13 attracting limited academic and policy scru-
tiny during this time.14 This began to change following Google’s 
high profile dual-class listing in 2004, with Facebook notably fol-
lowing suit in this regard in 2012.15 Today, in addition to Google (now 
listed under its parent company’s name Alphabet)16 and Facebook, 
other well-known U.S. listed companies with DCS structures17 in-
clude Snap, Lyft, Groupon, TripAdvisor, Nike, Levi Strauss, Ford, 
CBS, Comcast, News Corporation, The New York Times Com-
pany, and Berkshire Hathaway.18
 In the wake of the rapid proliferation and growing public 
salience of DCS in recent years, hostility towards differential vote 
capital structures has re-intensified with a comparable degree of 
13 By contrast, London’s indigenous institutional investor community (and, 
in particular, the influential Association of British Insurers) maintained a con-
sistently hostile stance toward deviation from the conventional one-vote-per-share 
norm within the U.K.’s listed company sector throughout this time, a position 
that largely persists today. See REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 81–82 (3rd ed.
2017) [hereinafter ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW]; Marc T. Moore & Edward 
Walker-Arnott, A Fresh Look at Stock Market Short-Termism, 41 J.L. & SOC’Y
416, 442 (2014). 
14 In 1988, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) unsuccess-
fully sought to introduce Rule 19c-4, which, in effect, would have mandated 
one-vote-per-share for all U.S.-listed companies as a universal stock exchange 
requirement. Sharfman, supra note 4, at 9. However, a federal district court subse-
quently enjoined this rule on the premise that the SEC significantly exceeded 
its statutory rule-making authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
to only regulate matters pertaining to securities-market disclosure, as opposed 
to issues of substantive corporate governance, which were the appropriate do-
main of individual states. See id.
15 See Dorothy S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance,
71 STAN. L. REV. 687, 704, 707 (2019). 
16 Although Alphabet actually now has a triple-class structure incorporating a 
third class of nonvoting (“C”) shares. On this, see infra Section I.A. 
17 For a comprehensive list of current DCS issuers as promulgated and 
maintained by the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), see COUNCIL OF 
INSTITUTIONAL INVS., DUAL CLASS COMPANIES LIST (2019). 
18 Id.; COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS., COMPANIES WITH TIME-BASED
SUNSETS ON DUAL-CLASS STOCK (Jun. 22, 2020), https://www.cii.org/files/6-22  
-20%20Time-based%20Sunsets.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Z8U-MLVF]. This is in spite 
of Berkshire Hathaway’s chairman/CEO Warren Buffet curiously pressurizing 
for the removal of DCSs in Berkshire Hathaway’s portfolio companies. Vijay 
Govindarajan et al., Should Dual-Class Shares Be Banned?, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Dec. 3, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/12/should-dual-class-shares-be-banned [https:// 
perma.cc/S59Q-5CG5]. 
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rapidity, especially within the United States’ institutional invest-
ment community.19 For instance, the Investor Stewardship Group 
(ISG), which represents over sixty major institutional investors with 
combined assets of over $31 trillion in market value, has effectively 
advocated for U.S.-listed companies to near-universally adhere to a 
one share/one vote norm in its influential Corporate Governance 
Principles.20 Moreover, since 2017, S&P Dow Jones Indices have sys-
tematically excluded any new companies conducting IPOs with 
multiple-voting shares from its influential S&P 1500 Composite 
Index (including its constituent S&P 500 Index),21 which forms 
the benchmark for major index-linked funds’22 multibillion-dollar 
19 Blair Nicholas & Brandon Marsh, Dual-Class: The Consequences of De-
priving Institutional Investors of Corporate Voting Rights, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 17, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05 
/17/dual-class-the-consequences-of-depriving-institutional-investors-of-corporate 
-voting-rights/ [https://perma.cc/3TGT-RBL9]. 
20 In particular, Principle 2 of the ISG Corporate Governance Principles as-
serts the general proposition that “[s]hareholders should be entitled to voting 
rights in proportion to their economic interest,” while Provision 2.1 recommends 
more specifically that “[c]ompanies should adopt a one-share, one-vote stand-
ard and avoid adopting share structures that create unequal voting rights 
among their shareholders.” Corporate Governance Principles for US Listed 
Companies, INV. STEWARDSHIP GRP., https://isgframework.org/corporate-gover 
nance-principles/ [https://perma.cc/H36E-5YDM]. Of more immediate signifi-
cance to the discussion at hand, though, is Provision 2.2 of the ISG Principles, 
which further stipulates that: 
Boards of companies that already have dual or multiple class 
share structures are expected to review these structures on a 
regular basis or as company circumstances change, and establish 
mechanisms to end or phase out controlling structures at the 
appropriate time [in other words, time-centered sunset provi-
sions], while minimizing costs to shareholders. 
Id.
21 See Scott Hirst & Kobi Kastiel, Corporate Governance by Index Exclusion,
99 B.U. L. REV. 1229, 1232 (2019). 
22 This group includes not just passive (or “tracker”) investment funds but 
also those active funds whose performance is benchmarked to a relevant market 
index. See Lawrence Carrell, Passive Management Marks Decade of Beating Active 
U.S. Stock Funds, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2020, 9:44 PM), https://www.forbes.com 
/sites/lcarrel/2020/04/20/passive-beats-active-large-cap-funds-10-years-in-a-row/# 
15d052d947b0 [https://perma.cc/DK2W-DAKR]; see also James Chen, Active Man-
agement, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/activemanage 
ment.asp [https://perma.cc/S2K6-ZEAN].
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investment portfolios.23 This controversial decision appears to 
have been taken largely in response to concerted lobbying from 
institutional investors and their representative bodies.24 In a sim-
ilar vein, the influential proxy advisory firm Institutional Share-
holder Services (ISS) has a general policy of recommending that 
its clients vote against reelecting the incumbent directors of any 
companies that offer differential voting shares as part of an initial 
or midstream public offering.25
23 One commentator has reported that “some $8.7 trillion in assets are bench-
marked or indexed to the S&P 500,” including a significant proportion of the 
asset portfolios managed by the so-called “mega-mutual fund advisors” Blackrock, 
Fidelity, Vanguard, and State Street. Sharfman, supra note 4, at 4, 13. 
24 See Press Release, S&P Dow Jones Indices, S&P Dow Jones Indices An-
nounces Decision on Multi-Class Shares and Voting Rules (Jul. 31, 2017), https:// 
www.spice-indices.com/idpfiles/spice-assets/resources/public/documents/561162 
_spdjimulti-classsharesandvotingrulesannouncement7.31.17.pdf?force_down 
load=true [https://perma.cc/8C5C-HCP5]; Andrew Winden & Andrew C. Baker, 
Dual-Class Index Exclusion 4, 10–11 (Rock Ctr. For Corp. Governance, Working Pa-
per Series No. 233, Aug. 6, 2018). For similar recent initiatives to this effect 
implemented by other major index providers, see id. at 3, 23–31; FTSE RUSSELL,
FTSE RUSSELL VOTING RIGHTS CONSULTATION—NEXT STEPS 3 (Jul. 2017), 
https://research.ftserussell.com/products/downloads/FTSE_Russell_Voting_Rights 
_Consultation_Next_Steps.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY3U-LBKW]; MSCI, CONSUL-
TATION ON THE TREATMENT OF UNEQUAL VOTING STRUCTURES IN THE MSCI
EQUITY INDEXES 4 (Jan. 2018), https://www.msci.com/documents/1296102/83 
28554/Consultation_Voting+Rights.pdf/15d99336-9346-4e42-9cd3-a4a03ecff3 
39 [https://perma.cc/9ARN-LHGN]. 
25 Specifically, ISS’s current proxy-voting policy recommends that share-
holders of public issuers generally vote against, or withhold support for, re-election 
of the latter’s incumbent directors “if, prior to or in connection with the com-
pany’s public offering, the company or its board [has] implemented a multi-class 
capital structure in which the classes have unequal voting rights without sub-
jecting the multi-class capital structure to a reasonable time-based sunset.” 
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES (ISS), UNITED STATES PUBLIC FUND
PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES UPDATES FOR 2020: 2020 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 6
(Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/specialty/Pub 
lic-Fund-US-Policy-Updates.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ9D-NA4Q] [hereinafter ISS 
2019(1)]; see also INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES (ISS), UNITED STATES
PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES: BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 14 (Nov. 18, 
2019), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/US-Voting-Guide 
lines.pdf [https://perma.cc/VU4Y-PDKY]. This is buttressed by an additional gen-
eral default recommendation that shareholders “vote against proposals to create 
a new class of common stock” in any investee company. See INSTITUTIONAL 
SHAREHOLDER SERVICES (ISS), UNITED STATES PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES:
BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 32 (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.iss 
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 On the other hand, in recent years, certain jurisdictions 
that have traditionally been averse to permitting DCSs have come 
to recognize the potential benefits of taking a more permissive 
stance on the matter.26 One of the most intriguing examples in this 
regard is Singapore.27 In June 2018, following an extensive con-
sultation process, the Singapore Exchange (SGX) took the landmark 
step of liberalizing its formerly preclusive listing requirements, 
with respect to differential vote capital structures, to permit issuers 
to deviate from the one share/one vote norm subject to specific 
regulatory restrictions.28 In taking this step, the SGX expressly 
sought to appeal to “companies led by founder entrepreneurs who 
require funding for a rapid ramp-up of the business while retaining 
the ability to execute on a long-term strategy.”29 This action was 
consistent with the country’s30 broader strategic ambition to po-
sition itself as “a tech and biomedical hub for start-ups,”31 in 
governance.com/file/policy/2019/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5DLG-QC5U]; see also INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES (ISS),
M&AEDGE NOTE:THE TRAGEDY OF THE DUAL CLASS COMMONS 1, 4 (Feb. 13, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/facebook0214.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/WW34-3HJ9]. 
26 See Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez, Theory, Evidence, and Policy on Dual-Class 
Shares: A Country-Specific Response to a Global Debate, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 15, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/07/15
/theory-evidence-and-policy-on-dual-class-shares-a-country-specific-response  
-to-a-global-debate/ [https://perma.cc/84ET-NS6E]. 
27 See Ivy Wong, The Revival of Dual Class Shares, INT’L FIN. LAW REVIEW
(Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.iflr.com/article/b1lmx6clj4l38j/the-revival-of-dual 
-class-shares [https://perma.cc/WQE9-MQFT]. 
28 See SGX Mainboard Rules, Rule 210(10)(f), http://rulebook.sgx.com/node 
/4870/revisions/13283/view [https://perma.cc/D6LS-YGX6]; infra text accompa-
nying note 271. 
29 Angela Tan, SGX Enters New Era as It Starts Dual Class Shares for Qual-
ifying IPOs, BUS. TIMES (June 27, 2018, 5:50 AM), https://www.businesstimes 
.com.sg/stocks/sgx-enters-new-era-as-it-starts-dual-class-shares-for-qualifying 
-ipos [https://perma.cc/S7XE-JW32] (quoting SGX CEO Loh Boon Chye).
30 Although Singapore Exchange Ltd. (the holding company that owns and 
has ultimate operational control over the SGX) is formally constituted as a pri-
vate limited company, its principal shareholder (with a 23.3% proportionate 
equity stake) is Temasek Holdings, which is one of Singapore’s largest state-owned 
sovereign wealth funds. See Singapore Exchange Ltd., NIKKEI ASIAN REVIEW,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Companies/Singapore-Exchange-Ltd [https://perma.cc 
/4H3Z-RYRR].
31 SING. EXCH., CONSULTATION PAPER: POSSIBLE LISTING FRAMEWORK FOR 
DUAL CLASS SHARE STRUCTURES 1–2 (Feb. 16, 2017) (citing 92 Sing. Parl. Deb. 
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recognition of the fact that “DCS listings are increasingly being 
considered in industries such as information technology and life 
sciences.”32 The reform also appears to have been motivated at least 
in part by Manchester United F.C.’s widely documented decision 
in 2012 to opt for a NYSE listing in preference to one on the 
Singapore Exchange,33 with the SGX’s former prohibition on DCS 
having been cited as a principal reason behind this move.34 In a 
similar vein, Hong Kong’s recently reformed (post-2017) listings 
regime has made limited allowance for DCS structures in the case 
of certain “innovative companies” as defined in the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange’s Listing Rules,35 which essentially denotes firms 
involved in the production of new technologies or other innova-
tions in which significant research and development (R&D) out-
lays are entailed.36 This is with an express view to encouraging 
emerging mainland Chinese tech companies to opt for a Hong 
Kong over United States listing in the future, and it is prompted 
in large part by the Chinese e-commerce conglomerate Alibaba’s 
controversial decision in 2014 to list on the NYSE instead of its 
Hong Kong counterpart.37
Off. Rep. (Ong Teng Koon, Member of Parliament)), https://www.rajahtannasia 
.com/media/2716/sgx_dcs_consultation_paper_-sgx_20170216-final.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/V4QJ-KENZ]. 
32 Id. at 2. 
33 CHARTERED FIN. ANALYST INST., DUAL-CLASS SHARES: THE GOOD, THE 
BAD, AND THE UGLY: A REVIEW OF THE DEBATE SURROUNDING DUAL-CLASS
SHARES AND THEIR EMERGENCE IN ASIA PACIFIC 2 (Aug. 2018), https://www.cfain 
stitute.org/-/media/documents/survey/apac-dual-class-shares-survey-report.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/D7MA-TU28] [hereinafter DUAL-CLASS SHARES IN ASIA PACIFIC].
34 John Geddie, Singapore Details Rules for Listing of Dual-Class Shares, 
Follows Hong Kong, REUTERS (June 26, 2018, 6:24 AM), https://www.reuters 
.com/article/sgx-regulation/singapore-details-rules-for-offering-dual-class-shares  
-follows-hong-kong-idUSL4N1TS3E3 [https://perma.cc/V4X9-GW4Z]. 
35 See Alphabet, Inc., Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of 
Alphabet Inc., art. 4(f) (“Conversion”) (Oct. 2, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives 
/edgar/data/1652044/000119312515336577/d82837dex31.htm [https://perma.cc 
/A9BE-6T4M]; infra text accompanying note 275. 
36 See HKEX, CONSULTATION PAPER: A LISTING REGIME FOR COMPANIES 




37 Alibaba’s NYSE listing followed the Hong Kong Exchange’s widely docu-
mented refusal to permit the company to list with a DCS structure, which 
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 In essence, the general policy debate on DCSs hangs on the 
purported conflict between, on the one hand, protecting the opera-
tional freedom of founders and other trusted corporate leaders to 
implement their long-term entrepreneurial vision, unimpeded by 
the destabilizing demands of short-termist activist investors38
versus, on the other, protecting outside minority investors from 
manifest managerial unaccountability and associated self-dealing 
risk.39 However, in recent years, academic debate on DCSs, espe-
cially in the United States, has begun to pivot less on the general 
merits of permitting, as opposed to prohibiting, DCSs, and more on 
the specific middle-ground issues of, first, whether DCSs should be 
perpetual or rather should terminate (or “sunset”) at some point in 
would have effectively entrenched long-term board control in the hands of its 
executive chairman and co-founder, Jack Ma. See Enoch Yiu, Securities Com-
mission Backs Introduction of Dual-Class Shares on Hong Kong Stock Exchange, S.
CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 20, 2017, 7:28 AM), https://www.scmp.com/busi 
ness/companies/article/2124972/securities-commission-backs-introduction-dual 
-class-shares-hong [https://perma.cc/5U3K-AT34]. Curiously, Alibaba recently 
undertook a $13 billion secondary listing on the Hong Stock Exchange in addi-
tion to its continuing NYSE primary listing. See Tom Mitchell, Hong Kong is 
Testing Whether Finance Needs the Rule of Law, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/e2e3c064-0d07-11ea-bb52-34c8d9dc6d84 (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2020). This action has been perceived internationally as a significant 
endorsement of the region’s newly liberalized listings framework in otherwise 
turbulent socio-political times. See id.; Hudson Lockett & George Hammond, 
Alibaba’s Stock Jumps on Hong Kong Trading Debut, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 26, 
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/8f7af224-0f3e-11ea-a7e6-62bf4f9e 548a (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2020); see also Hong Kong’s Listing Regime Enters New Era, Fea-
turing Emerging and Innovative Firms, HKEX (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.hkex 
.com.hk/News/Regulatory-Announcements/2018/180424news?sc_lang=en [https:// 
perma.cc/HLN4-T234]. 
38 According to one influential source: 
The single most important feature of DCS structures is that 
they give founders, entrepreneurs, and other corporate insiders 
voting control of the listed entity … [which is purportedly] desira-
ble because it allows charismatic, visionary founders and entre-
preneurs to execute their vision (especially in the early years of a 
public company) without having to worry unduly about stock 
market performance.  
DUAL-CLASS SHARES IN ASIA PACIFIC, supra note 33, at 8. 
39 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, INV. ADVISORY COMM., DUAL CLASS AND OTHER
ENTRENCHING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC COMPANIES 2–3, 8–9 (Dis-
cussion Draft 2012), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee 
-2012/discussion-draft-dual-class-recommendation-iac-120717.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/34KE-VR2S].
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time, and, second, the most appropriate means of determining when 
and how time-limited DCSs should sunset.40 While debate on these 
more granular questions is no less fervent, the continuing permis-
sibility of DCSs in at least some conditional format is now becoming 
an increasingly common premise of such discussions.41
 On the vexing question of optimal sunset design there are 
three broad schools of thought,42 each of which will be critically 
examined below.43 The first, and increasingly most common, view in 
this regard is that sunset provisions should be time-conditioned, 
with the effect that a DCS structure automatically sunsets after 
a predetermined time period (for example, seven, ten or fifteen 
years) unless affirmatively resolved otherwise by a majority of 
independent (in other words, non-super-voting) shareholders.44 The 
second common view is that sunset provisions should ideally be 
ownership-based, such that multiple-vote shares automatically con-
vert, subject to offsetting independent shareholder resolution, to 
single-vote shares upon their holder’s proportionate holding of cash-
flow rights dropping below a predetermined minimum threshold (for 
example, 10%, 15%, or 20%).45 And the third common view is that 
sunset provisions should be transfer-based, such that DCSs auto-
matically convert (again subject to any countervailing independent 
shareholder vote) upon the death, incapacitation, or retirement (from 
the company’s board) of their original holder, or if otherwise trans-
ferred to someone other than that specified person.46 In the dis-
cussion that follows, these three competing schools of thought on the 
question of optimal sunset design will be referred to, respectively, 
40 Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1062–64, 1078–79, 1086. 
41 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 601. 
42 Although it may be disputed that there are in fact four broad schools of 
thought on this issue, insofar as there remain a number of commentators wed-
ded to one of the polar extreme views to the effect that there should be no scope 
for sunsetting at all, either because DCSs should be perpetual and constrained 
only by market forces; or, conversely, because they should be prohibited out-
right such that the question of sunsetting never becomes an issue in the first 
place. See infra Section I.B. However, in the discussion that follows we will pre-
sent these more juxtaposed arguments separately from those focusing on the 
question of optimal sunset design itself. Id.
43 See infra Part II. 
44 See infra Section II.A. 
45 See infra Section II.B. 
46 See infra Section II.C. 
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as: (a) the “time-centered” model, (b) the “ownership-centered” model,
and (c) the “transfer-centered” model of sunset design.47
 Against the above background, this Article compares the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of each of the above posi-
tions. On this basis, it seeks to determine which—if any—of those 
models is preferable, whether as an influence for private ordering 
at the individual firm level, or as a blueprint for broader-reaching 
regulatory policy design. Accordingly, the discussion is structured 
as follows. Part I briefly documents the parameters of the general 
academic and policy debate on dual-class and other differential vote 
capital structures. It begins by explaining the essential structural 
features of DCS as a general institutional phenomenon.48 It looks 
at the highly variable ways in which they have been dealt with on 
a regulatory level across different jurisdictions.49 It then exam-
ines the polar extreme positions of the ongoing academic debate 
on DCS—which argue, respectively, for outright facilitation ver-
sus prohibition of those structures—before assessing how this debate 
has increasingly come to focus on the more specific common-ground 
concern of optimal sunset design.50 Part II outlines the key fea-
tures and policy rationales for each of the three principal models 
of DCS sunset provision referred to above. 
 Part III presents a normative argument in favor of the 
transfer-centered model and highlights its main comparative ad-
vantages over the other two models from both a private ordering 
and public-regulatory perspective. Here it will be claimed that the 
transfer-centered model is not only less arbitrary in its application 
than the competitor models, but also less inclined to elicit moral 
hazard and other perverse incentives on the part of corporate 
controllers.51 Finally, this Article will posit that the transfer-centered 
model has the additional advantage of remaining sensitive to the 
powerful non-financial incentives that incumbent controllers typ-
ically have to safeguard and promote firm value, even when their 
corporate control rights significantly outweigh their corresponding 
cash flow rights.52 The Conclusion suggests that, in view of the 
47 See generally infra Parts II–III. 
48 See infra Section I.A. 
49 See id. 
50 See infra Section I.B. 
51 See infra Sections III.A, III.B. 
52 See infra Section III.C. 
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complexity and context-dependency of the various factors involved, 
there remains a strong case for devolving the question of optimal 
sunset design to firm-specific private ordering.53 Nonetheless, to the 
extent that such provisions are voluntarily adopted or regulatorily 
mandated, whether in the United States or elsewhere, then the 
transfer-centered model would appear the least-worst blueprint for 
lawyers and/or policymakers to work from.54
I. THE PARAMETERS OF THE DUAL-CLASS STOCK (DCS) DEBATE
A. Essential Features and Regulatory Treatment of DCS  
Structures
 A dual-class stock (or DCS) structure, according to one au-
thoritative source, is “a share structure that gives certain share-
holders voting rights disproportionate to their shareholding” such 
that “[s]hares in one class carry one vote, while shares in another 
class carry multiple votes.”55 In this regard, DCS structures 
constitute one particular form of a broader corporate governance 
phenomenon known as a “controlling-minority structure,” a cate-
gory which also includes stock pyramids and cross-holdings.56 The 
common feature of all such structures is that they enable the sep-
aration of control and cash flow rights, consequently permitting a 
dominant equity investor to enjoy effective voting control over the 
firm while holding only a minority of cash flow rights.57 The stan-
dard DCS structure—in United States-listed companies at least—
is for multiple-vote (so-called super-voting) shares to carry ten 
votes each, with ordinary shares carrying only one vote each.58
For example, Facebook’s 10:1 weighted dual-class structure ena-
bles its founder, Mark Zuckerberg, together with a small group of 
inside associates, to exercise majority voting control despite having 
53 See infra notes 402–04 and accompanying text. 
54 See infra notes 393–97 and accompanying text. 
55 Listing Framework for Dual Class Share Structures, SGX (June 26, 2018), 
http://rulebook.sgx.com/sites/default/files/net_file_store/SGX_Mainboard_Rules 
_June_26_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/73Z4-ZFWX].  
56 On this, see LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK ET AL., CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWN-
ERSHIP 295–96 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000). 
57 Id. at 295. 
58 See infra note 273 and accompanying text.  
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only a 14% cash flow interest in the firm.59 In the case of Alphabet 
(Google), meanwhile, Larry Page and Sergey Brin are positioned 
to exercise majority voting control on the basis of just an 11% cash 
flow interest.60 Moreover, this has remained the case following 
Page and Brin’s recent relinquishment of their former managerial 
positions as Alphabet’s CEO and President, respectively.61
 More recent events would indicate that this trend is becoming 
even further intensified.62 In the high-profile 2019 IPO of the ride-
hailing firm Lyft and social media giant Pinterest (and, somewhat 
59 Shannon Bond & Nicole Bullock, Lyft IPO Revs up Debate on Dual-Class 
Share Structures, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/c7d3 
23ba-36b0-11e9-bd3a-8b2a211d90d5 (last visited Oct. 30, 2020). Although it is 
noteworthy that, in Facebook’s 2019 annual shareholder meeting, over 83% of 
Facebook’s independent (i.e., single-vote) shareholders supported a recommenda-
tion to abolish the company’s DCS structure in view of its perceived mishandling of 
a number of recent high-profile corporate scandals. Jake Kanter, Facebook Investors 
Voted in Support of Proposals to Fire Mark Zuckerberg as Chairman, but Zuckerberg 
Still Holds Power, INC. (June 12, 2019), https://www.inc.com/business-insider 
/facebook-investors-vote-in-support-fire-mark-zuckerberg-chairman.html [https:// 
perma.cc/A4SP-RADK]. This was accompanied by a parallel proposal, which 
likewise commanded majority independent shareholder support, in favor of sepa-
rating the CEO and chairman positions on the company’s board, both of which con-
tinue to be held by its founder Mark Zuckerberg. Id. However, Zuckerberg’s 
ongoing opposition to the above reforms meant that both proposals were ulti-
mately defeated by his weighted votes cast against the relevant motions. Id.
60 Bobby V. Reddy, Finding the British Google: Relaxing the Prohibition of 
Dual-Class Stock from the Premium-Tier of the London Stock Exchange 3 (Nov. 29, 
2019) (Univ. of Cambridge Fac. of L. Rsch. Paper, Paper No. 4/2020), https://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3495309 [https://perma.cc/7U97-WCUB]. 
See also Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 608. To cite an even more ex-
treme example, the 10:1 DCS structure employed by the ride-hailing platform 
operator Lyft following its 2019 IPO enables its cofounders Logan Green and 
John Zimmer to exercise effective outright voting control despite having a less 
than 5% cash flow interest in the firm. See Lucian Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, 
The Perils of Lyft’s Dual-Class Structure, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG. (Apr. 3, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/04/03/the-perils -
of-lyfts-dual-class-structure/ [https://perma.cc/MK7M-K5AF] [hereinafter Bebchuck 
& Kastiel, Lyft]. 
61 See Larry Page & Sergey Brin, A Letter from Larry and Sergey, GOOGLE:
THE KEYWORD (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.blog.google/inside-google/alphabet 
/letter-from-larry-and-sergey/ [https://perma.cc/6KYF-2YTN]; Rob Copeland, 
Google Co-Founders Page, Brin Give Up Management Roles, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 
2019, 6:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sundar-pichai-to-replace-larry-page 
-as-ceo-of-alphabet-11575409229 [https://perma.cc/Q4WD-GP3R]. 
62 See Bond & Bullock, supra note 59. 
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ominously, in the initial filings for WeWork’s recently aborted IPO 
attempt63), the super-voting shares’ voting rights outweighed those 
attached to ordinary shares by a 20:1 ratio.64 A small group of 
U.S.-listed companies including Snap, Alphabet, and Under Ar-
mour have recently gone even further than this and adopted triple 
class share structures, which include a third class of nonvoting 
(“C”) shares.65 In the case of Snap,66 this structure has moreover 
existed since the company’s IPO in March 2017.67
 It is well-known that nonvoting or low-vote shares typically 
trade at a material discount, not only vis-à-vis multiple-vote shares 
but also in relation to the common stock of those firms adopting 
an orthodox one share/one vote capital structure.68 This is in 
(negative) reflection of the so-called private benefits of control 
that the holders of multiple-vote shares are positioned to exploit 
63 Attracta Mooney, Big Investors Fight Back over Dual-Class Shares, FIN.
TIMES (Nov. 24, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/bc220535-5055-47ce-811d-fc4 
a56d32937 (last visited Oct. 30, 2020). 
64 See Benjamin Willis, Will Super-Voting Stock Get a Tax Lyft?, FORBES
(Feb. 6, 2020, 11:58 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/taxnotes/2020/02/06/will 
-super-voting-stock-get-a-tax-lyft/#4bd72c3152fd [https://perma.cc/PJ2A-6FEW]. 
However, it is noteworthy that Lyft’s major competitor Uber ultimately opted 
against adopting a multiple-vote capital structure in its high-profile 2019 IPO 
on the NYSE, having earlier removed a DCS structure that had formerly pro-
tected the company’s early stage investors (including its controversial cofounder 
Travis Kalanick) as a condition of attracting a $9 billion pre-IPO investment from 
SoftBank. Bond & Bullock, supra note 59. 
65 See Kaitlin Descovich et al., Voting Rights Gone in a Snap—Unequal Vot-
ing Rights Back in the Spotlight, GOVERNANCE & SEC. WATCH (Apr. 3, 2017), 
https://governance.weil.com/whats-new/voting-rights-gone-in-a-snap-unequal 
-shareholder-voting-rights-back-in-the-spotlight/ [https://perma.cc/PF2Z-J5T7].
66 Facebook unsuccessfully attempted to implement a similar structure in 
2018 to enable its founder Mark Zuckerberg to maintain majority voting con-
trol over the firm even after selling a significant proportion of his initial multi-
vote shares to fund personal philanthropic ventures. See DUAL-CLASS SHARES 
IN ASIA PACIFIC, supra note 33, at 8.
67 See id. at 62. Alternatively (and much less commonly today in U.S.-listed 
companies at least), a DCS structure might be constituted by a so-called “hard-
wiring” provision whereby a controlling minority is entitled to a fixed percentage 
of votes in annual shareholder meetings, notwithstanding the corresponding 
proportion of equity that they happen to own at any particular point in time. 
See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 608. 
68 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for 
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 462 (2001).
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at the expense of the low- or nonvoters.69 Insofar as investors are col-
lectively capable of pricing the relative outside shareholder friend-
liness of these alternative vote distributions, then it may well be 
argued (as many commentators have) that the evaluation of DCS 
structures is ultimately best left to the invisible hand of stock mar-
ket forces.70 Indeed, such an ethos essentially characterizes the 
modern regulatory stance on this issue that has prevailed in the 
United States since the mid-1980s.71 Accordingly, under NYSE and 
NASDAQ listing rules alike, both multiple-vote shares and non-
voting shares are permitted at IPO stage.72 However, so-called “mid-
stream” variations in capital structure that disparately reduce or 
restrict the voting rights of existing shareholders are prohibited.73
 While it is customary to think of the U.S. corporate governance 
framework as an influential yardstick for broader global develop-
ments in the field,74 this is one area in which—viewed from a com-
parative standpoint—the contemporary American position would 
appear to be more international outlier rather than norm.75 Indeed, 
69 See ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 79–80. 
70 See infra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.  
71 See Bebchuck and Kastiel, supra note 12 and accompanying text. Other 
jurisdictions adopting a generally permissive regulatory stance in respect of DCSs 
today. See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 599 (including the jurisdictions 
of Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands); see also Zoe Condon, Com-
ment, A Snapshot of Dual-Class Share Structures in the Twenty-First Century: A 
Solution to Reconcile Shareholder Protections with Founder Autonomy, 68 EMORY
L. J. 335, 357 (2018) (including jurisdiction of France); Koji Toshima, 
Cyberdyne’s Dual-Class IPO, 40 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 43, 43 (2015) (including ju-
risdiction of Japan).  
72 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 597. 
73 See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, Rule 313.00 
(2020), https://nyse.wolterskluwer.cloud/listed-company-manual [https://perma 
.cc/E6S4-76P4]; see also NASDAQ STOCK MARKET LISTING RULES, Rule 5640
(last amended Dec. 3, 2019), https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/nasdaq 
/rules/nasdaq-5000#nasdaq-rule_5600 [https://perma.cc/UEH9-QQ7F]. Although, 
as against the above prohibition on midstream conversion of existing common 
stock to dual-class status, it has recently been argued that “single-class firms should 
be given an option to convert to dual-class shares through a shareholder vote, in 
order to carry out significant transformations, instead of having to completely 
delist in order to achieve that goal.” Govindarajan et al., supra note 18. 
74 See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 68.  
75 See id. at 456. 
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the general regulatory tolerance shown towards DCS structures in 
the U.S. listings environment puts it in stark contrast with numerous 
other jurisdictions across the world including Austria,76 Belgium,77
Brazil,78 Germany,79 Italy,80 Spain,81 and the United Kingdom.82
A common feature of all the above countries’ respective corporate 
and/or securities law systems is their adoption of a much more 
protectionist (by U.S. standards)—if not altogether prohibitive—
stance concerning the regulatory treatment of multi-vote capital 
structures in listed companies.83 At a supranational level, mean-
while, the so-called “breakthrough rule” embodied in the European 
Union Takeover Directive is designed to mitigate the risk of DCSs 
and other insider-friendly voting structures being used as a pre-
clusive roadblock to cross-border corporate control bids within the 
EU single market environment.84
76 See MARCCUS PARTNERS & THE CTR. FOR EUROPEAN POL’Y STUD., THE
TAKEOVER BIDS DIRECTIVE ASSESSMENT REPORT 196–97 (2012), https://op.eu 
ropa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/67501b75-7583-4b0d-a551-33051d8 
e27c1 (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) [hereinafter TAKEOVER BIDS]. 
77 See id.
78 In Brazil, DCSs are prohibited in the voluntary listing segment Novo Mer-
cado, but are otherwise permitted. See PEDRO MATOS, CFA INST., AN ASSESS-
MENT OF DUAL-CLASS SHARES IN BRAZIL 1 (2018), https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/me 
dia/documents/support/advocacy/dual_class_shares_in_brazil.ashx [https://perma 
.cc/4QRD-DR84].  
79 Germany has an outright legal prohibition on multiple vote shares along 
with significant limitations on the issuance of restricted- or non-voting shares. 
See DUAL-CLASS SHARES IN ASIA PACIFIC, supra note 33, at 29. 
80 TAKEOVER BIDS, supra note 76, at 196.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 See Jennifer Payne, Time to Make the Board Neutrality Rule Mandatory 
in the EU, OXFORD BUS.L.BLOG (June 7, 2016), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business 
-law-blog/blog/2016/06/time-make-board-neutrality-rule-mandatory-eu [https:// 
perma.cc/9ND3-W8JS]. 
84 The breakthrough rule, which is set out in Article 11 of the EU Takeover 
Directive, is triggered by an offeror’s (that is, bidder’s) acquisition of at least 75% of 
equity or cash flow rights in the offeree (in other words, target) company. Council 
Directive 2004/25/EC, art. 11, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12, 20 (EC). Once implemented, this 
provision has the effect of automatically converting any multi-vote shares in the 
offeree company to single-vote status for the purpose of any general meeting of 
shareholders that is convened to decide on whether any frustrative bid defense(s) 
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 Amongst the most interesting examples in this regard is the 
United Kingdom where, despite unorthodox share voting structures 
having been treated in a liberal manner by the English courts,85
London’s traditional capital market norms have proved considerably 
less tolerant.86 Moreover, the new (post-2013) enhanced listing 
should be deployed. Id. This consequently enables the offeror—metaphorically 
speaking—to permeate the wall of insulation that the weighted voting structure 
would otherwise have provided to the offeree company’s management in the face 
of a hostile acquisition attempt. See TAKEOVER BIDS, supra note 76, at 195. 
Notably, the breakthrough rule does not apply mandatorily across the EU, but 
rather only takes effect at a domestic level if, and when, a member state af-
firmatively “opts in” to its application. Id. at 188. An Assessment Report on the 
Takeover Directive’s implementation carried out in 2012 found that, despite the 
breakthrough rule’s initial promise in 2004 to help facilitate a free pan-European 
market in corporate control, only one member state (namely Estonia) had actually 
applied the provision in full at a domestic level. Id. at 195. However, as high-
lighted above, the fact that in numerous EU member states including Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, DCS structures are either difficult 
or impossible to implement in listed companies in any event, arguably renders 
the limited domestic take-up of the breakthrough rule less materially signifi-
cant in practice. See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text. 
Curiously, despite the common association of the breakthrough rule with 
the EU capital markets regime, its impact has actually been much more exten-
sive in Japan where it exists today as a general listing requirement of the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange. See Toshima, supra note 71, at 43. See generally Payne, supra
note 83; Thomas Papadopoulos, The Mandatory Provisions of the EU Takeover Bid 
Directive and Their Deficiencies, 6 L. & FIN. MKTS. REV. 525 (2015). 
85 See, for example, Lord Upjohn’s classic dictum in the landmark House of 
Lords decision in Bushell v. Faith [1970] AC 1099 (HL) 1109 (appeal taken from 
Eng.), to the effect that “Parliament has never sought to fetter the right of the 
company to issue a share with such rights or restrictions as it may think fit.” 
86 See Moore & Walker-Arnott, supra note 13, at 442. It has been recorded that:  
[i]n the eyes of the United Kingdom’s major [domestic] share-
holding institutions and their representative organizations (es-
pecially the Association of British Insurers), differential voting 
entitlements have traditionally been viewed as an illegitimate dis-
tortion of shareholder democracy and—more worryingly—a means 
by which unscrupulous corporate managers can extract benefits 
far in excess of their corresponding cash-flow rights in the firm. 
Id. Consequently, “the [London] market has for many decades exhibited some-
thing of a quasi-religious devotion to the democratic mantra of one share/one 
vote” as an “unwritten but yet highly influential principle.” Id.
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regime87 applicable to premium-listed88 companies on the London 
Stock Exchange’s main market requires that such higher-tier is-
suers conform to the dual equality and proportionality principles 
as set out within U.K. Listing Rules.89 The former of those princi-
ples dictates that “[a]ll equity shares in a class that has been ad-
mitted to premium listing must carry an equal number of votes 
on any shareholder vote.”90 More significantly for the discussion 
at hand, the latter principle insists that “[w]here a listed company 
has more than one class of securities admitted to premium listing, 
the aggregate voting rights of the securities in each class should 
be broadly proportionate to the relative interests of those classes 
in the equity of the listed company.”91
87 On this generally, see FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, CP13/15, FEEDBACK 
ON CP12/25: ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LISTING REGIME AND 
FURTHER CONSULTATION (2013), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation 
/cp13-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/89V3-HGTW]; Roger Barker & Iris H.Y. Chiu, 
Protecting Minority Shareholders in Blockholder-Controlled Companies: Eval-
uating the UK’s Enhanced Listing Regime in Comparison with Investor Protection 
Regimes in New York and Hong Kong, 10 CAP. MKTS. L. J. 98 (2015). 
88 An equity issuer on the main market of the London Stock Exchange has 
the option of undertaking either a standard or premium listing. LONDON STOCK 
EXCHANGE, MAIN MARKET: A GUIDE TO LISTING ON THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE
8, 15 (2010), https://docs.londonstockexchange.com/sites/default/files/documents 
/guide-main-market-pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9DQ-SRR8]. In the latter instance, 
the issuer essentially agrees to be subject to a more rigorous compliance burden 
than its standard-listed counterparts with respect to key disclosure and internal 
governance matters, as the payoff for (in theory at least) engendering higher trust 
from investors and reducing its ongoing cost of capital accordingly. Id. at 8. In 
particular, the so-called “super-equivalent” rules applicable to premium-listed 
companies notably go beyond the minimal requirements under EU law to which 
London’s standard-listed segment is subject. Id. at 15. 
89 See U.K. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FCA HANDBOOK: LISTING RULES LR 7.2.1.A 
(2020), https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/LR.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/7YAR-WJ32].
90 Id.
91 Id. (emphasis added). The equality and proportionality principles appli-
cable to London’s premium-listed market segment are reinforced today by the 
additional independent business requirement, whereby “[a]n applicant [for 
premium listing] must demonstrate that it carries on an independent business 
as its main activity.” Id. at LR 6.4.1. This entails (inter alia) that the relevant 
issuer must have access to financing from more than one person or group and must 
not be subject to overarching strategic control on the part of any other person or 
group. See id. at LR 6.4.3. Relatedly, an applicant for premium listing that has 
a controlling shareholder must be able to show that it is capable of carrying on 
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 Although—as highlighted above92—the U.K. enhanced listing 
regime is just one of many domestic and supranational regulatory 
frameworks to have adopted a broadly hostile stance in relation 
to DCSs,93 it is nonetheless an example that merits special atten-
tion in the context of the discussion at hand. This is because it 
demonstrates that a country with a fundamentally similar capital 
market environment to the United States,94 and also a broadly 
similar politico-economic tradition,95 can take a starkly different 
an independent business despite that shareholder’s presence, having regard (inter 
alia) to whether that shareholder is able directly or indirectly to influence the 
company’s operations, and also to whether the company has access to any in-
dependent sources of finance other than that shareholder. Id. at LR 6.5. 
Furthermore, any applicant for premium listing that has a controlling share-
holder (including a DCS or other controlling minority structure) must enter into 
a written and legally binding agreement with that shareholder (known as a 
relationship agreement), under which the controlling shareholder undertakes 
not to circumvent the issuing company’s compliance with the above requirements 
by seeking unduly to influence its strategy, operations, or financing. Id. at LR 
6.5.4. Finally, any such higher-tier issuer is required to hold a dual shareholder 
approval vote both including and excluding any controlling shareholder(s) on 
the (re)election of any of its independent directors, albeit that a negative inde-
pendent (that is, noncontrolling) shareholder vote does not in itself necessarily 
impede reelection of any candidate(s) that have the controller’s support. Id. at 
LR 9.2.2E–F. On the above dual-vote procedure and the practical limitations 
thereof, see Bobby V. Reddy, The Fat Controller: Slimming Down the Excesses 
of Controlling Shareholders in UK Listed Companies, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
733, 742–47 (2018). 
92 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
93 Id.
94 Like the United States, the United Kingdom is renowned today (at least 
in corporate governance terms) for its characteristic system of widely dispersed 
public company share ownership and, correspondingly, the substantial absence 
(in relation to continental European and Asian style “blockholder” governance 
systems at least) of dominant family, state, or other controlling shareholder 
influences in this context. See MARC MOORE & MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: LAW, REGULATION AND THEORY 10–14 (2017). See generally BRIAN 
R. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH BUSINESS TRANS-
FORMED chs. 9–10 (2008). 
95 See MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT 98–103 (2003). Although, for a more nu-
anced transatlantic comparative analysis in this regard, see generally CHRISTOPHER
M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE POLITI-
CAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER ch. 5 (2013); Brian R. Cheffins, 
Putting Britain on the Roe Map: The Emergence of the Berle-Means Corporation 
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regulatory and policy position in relation to DCSs where this is 
deemed necessary to combat the threat to minority shareholder 
welfare posed by potentially overreaching corporate controllers.96
The ensuing inference, at least insofar as U.S. corporate govern-
ance is concerned, is that the United States’ permissive modern 
stance on DCS structures in publicly traded companies is by no 
means the only possible way for it to go here. 
B. The Polar Extremes of the DCS Debate: Facilitation Versus 
Prohibition
1. The Case for Facilitation 
 In the eyes of DCS defenders, the recent spread of insider-
oriented capital structures is evidence of a well-functioning market 
dynamic at work.97 Accordingly, entrepreneurs and investors who 
in the United Kingdom, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE 
AND DIVERSITY 147 (Joseph A. McCahery et al. eds., 2002); Marc T. Moore, 
Shareholder Primacy, Labour and the Historic Ambivalence of UK Company 
Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE AND COMPANY 
LAW 142 (Harwell Wells ed., 2018). 
96 See BRUNER, supra note 95, at 143–44. However, against the above back-
ground, it is curious to note recent media reports that the U.K. government 
has been consulting privately with London’s institutional investment commu-
nity, potentially with a view to reforming the country’s listings framework so 
as to make it more attractive to high-growth firms, including dynamic tech 
startups. Reddy, supra note 60, at 4. Whether this will result in the U.K. Listing 
Authority relaxing to some extent its current prohibition on DCS within London’s 
premium listed sector remains to be seen. In the present author’s opinion such 
an outcome is unlikely, although for a contrary view on the matter see Reddy, 
supra note 60, at 4. See Daniel Thomas, Philip Stafford & Patrick Jenkins, UK
Seeks Change in Listing Rules to Lure Tech Start-ups, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/d4d2da5a-fee8-11e9-be59-e49b2a136b8d (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2020); Fin. Times Ed. Bd., Why Dual-Class Shares Deserve Consideration,
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/6f576e60-0231-11ea-be59 
-e49b2a136b8d (last visited Oct. 30, 2020). See generally HMTREASURY, FINANCING 




97 See Sharfman, supra note 4, at 1–3; Bernard S. Sharfman, The Undesir-
ability of Mandatory Time-Based Sunsets in Dual Class Share Structures: A 
Reply to Bebchuk and Kastiel, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 1, 2–4 (2019) [here-
inafter Sharfman, Sunsets].
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are favorable to DCSs in their unbridled format are free to sup-
port any company’s adoption of such a voting structure voluntar-
ily, whether at the IPO stage or thereafter.98 Vice versa, those 
firms whose market circumstances and organizational character-
istics are more attuned to the standard one share/one vote model 
always have the option of adopting either the default single-class 
voting structure or, alternatively, some contractually bespoke sunset 
clause in their certificate of incorporation.99 On this premise, the 
fact that so many DCS structures persist is a sign of their pre-
sumptive efficiency.100 The essential normative claim here is that 
entrepreneurs’ continuing widespread adoption of DCSs, and in-
vestors’ corresponding widespread tolerance of such structures, is 
testament to the propensity of DCSs to reduce the net costs of 
production for many firms.101 Otherwise, DCSs would necessarily 
have been precluded—or, at least, substantially eradicated—by 
the market-driven natural selection process.102
98 See NASDAQ, THE PROMISE OF MARKET REFORM: REIGNITING AMERICA’S
ECONOMIC ENGINE 17 (Feb. 2018), https://www.nasdaq.com/docs/Nasdaq_Blue 
print_to_Revitalize_Capital_Markets_April_2018_tcm5044-43175.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/5NH4-GSTN]; see also Sharfman, supra note 4, at 6. 
99 On the principal broad choices available to companies in this regard, see 
discussion infra Sections II.A–C. 
100 For a critical appraisal of the concept of presumptive (or a priori) effi-
ciency as adopted within law and economics scholarship generally, see Paddy 
Ireland, Defending the Rentier: Corporate Theory and the Reprivatisation of the 
Public Company, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COMPANY 162 (John Parkinson 
et al. eds., 2000). 
101 On the relation between corporate control rights and the firm’s overall 
net production costs generally, see Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Essay, 
Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COLUM.
L. REV. 767, 783 (2017). 
102 On the notion of securities market forces as a (presumptively efficient) 
natural selection mechanism, see generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL 
R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1 (1991). Easterbrook 
and Fischel posit that:  
self-interested entrepreneurs and managers, just like other in-
vestors, are driven to find the devices most likely to maximize 
net profits. If they do not, they pay for their mistakes because 
they receive lower prices for corporate paper. Any one firm may 
deviate from the optimal measures. Over tens of years and 
thousands of firms, though, tendencies emerge. The firms and 
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 On one view, the spread of DCS structures in the U.S. stock 
market environment can be seen as a response to a largely U.S.-
specific phenomenon: that is, the increasing concentration of 
the country’s traditionally fragmented public company ownership 
base, and the corresponding centralization of corporate govern-
ance influence in the hands of a relatively small and increasingly 
interconnected group of institutional investor bodies.103 Allied 
to this development is the significantly enhanced challenge to 
managerial hegemony posed by activist hedge funds, who have 
shown a growing willingness to use (actual or threatened) proxy 
contests as a means of extracting major concessions from boards 
and/or CEOs on key strategic or financial matters, against the 
backdrop of the latter’s potential imminent displacement.104 One 
notable consequence of this conspicuous landscape shift has been 
a diminution in the functional value of U.S. corporate law’s 
characteristic principle of director primacy,105 whereby boards of 
directors are perceived as exercising largely untrammeled pre-
rogative106 in determining the strategic direction of the business.107
DCS structures can thus be regarded as a crucial bulwark for public 
company boards and managers against destabilizing pressures 
from activist hedge funds and other aggressive capital market 
managers that make the choices investors prefer will prosper 
relative to others. 
Id. at 6. 
103 See David J. Berger, Why Dual Class Stock? A Response to CII’s Petition 
to NASDAQ for Mandatory Sunset Provisions 7–8 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3365154 [https://perma 
.cc/6CG9-QKAF]. 
104 See generally Sharfman, supra note 4, at 12; Bernard S. Sharfman, The 
Tension Between Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate Law, 12 J. L. ECON. &
POL’Y 251 (2016). 
105 Insofar as Delaware corporations are concerned, the doctrinal basis of 
the director primacy principle is § 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law, which provides that “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation orga-
nized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board 
of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its cer-
tificate of incorporation.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2020). 
106 On this, see generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The 
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW.UNIV.L.REV. 547, 547–52 (2002). 
107 See Sharfman, supra note 4, at 23–25. 
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actors,108 thereby resetting U.S. corporate governance’s conven-
tional board-centric equilibrium.109
 The propensity of DCS structures to shift the balance of 
corporate decision-making power away from “outside” minority 
shareholders, and—correspondingly—towards “inside” owner con-
trollers aligns with a parallel shift that has occurred on an aca-
demic level in recent years.110 This has involved a progressive 
withdrawal by corporate law scholars from the orthodox “agency 
costs” thought paradigm,111 which for the past four decades has 
lent sustained conceptual support to U.S. corporate governance’s 
prevailing shareholder value orientation.112 In its place, a group 
of alternative theories of corporate governance has evolved, which 
in varying ways purports to provide a more balanced and insider-
oriented view of corporate decision-making.113 The intellectual 
precursor to this evolving countermovement was Margaret Blair 
and Lynn Stout’s classical “team production” theory of the firm.114
Blair and Stout’s theory essentially sought to portray the board of 
directors, rather than shareholders, as the corporation’s supreme 
governance authority.115 Shareholders were correspondingly rele-
gated to the status of a mere productive input provider, in their case, 
108 As Goshen and Squire have highlighted, “neither activist hedge funds 
nor hostile raiders can force the managers of a dual-class firm to change their 
business strategy.” See Goshen & Squire, supra note 101, at 806. 
109 On this, see Bainbridge, supra note 106. 
110 See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and 
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 301–02 (1983); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Prob-
lems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 288–89 (1980); Michael 
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305–06, 309 (1976).  
111 The seminal contributions to this landmark school of thought are Fama 
& Jensen, supra note 110, at 301–02; Fama, supra note 110, at 288–89; Jensen 
& Meckling, supra note 110, at 305–06, 309. 
112 On this, see generally Ireland, supra note 100. 
113 On this developing alternative school of thought, which the present au-
thor has previously termed the post-shareholder-value (or “PSV”) paradigm, 
see Marc T. Moore, A Necessary Social Evil: The Indispensability of the Share-
holder Value Corporation, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 427, 438–42 (2017). 
114 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 248, 248–49 (1999). 
115 Blair and Stout claim that, “[a]s the ultimate decision-making body 
within the firm, [directors] are not subject to direct control or supervision by 
anyone, including the firm’s shareholders.” Id. at 290. 
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of equity capital, to the firm in the same vein as employees and 
suppliers.116 Blair and Stout’s theory thus afforded shareholders 
no privileged governance status over other stakeholder groups.117
They moreover rejected the notion that corporate law was de-
signed to provide shareholders with any such exalted status.118
 Blair and Stout’s essential mantle in this regard has since 
been taken up, in varying ways, by a range of other leading scholars 
in recent times, such that non-shareholder-centric conceptions of 
corporate law that contest the traditional agency costs position 
have increasingly become the mainstream view within the legal 
academy today.119 Most well-known in this regard is Stephen 
Bainbridge’s influential director primacy theory of corporate 
governance, which emphatically rejects—both descriptively and 
normatively—the notion of shareholders as wielding any sort of su-
perior decision-making influence over boards.120 Contrary to Blair 
and Stout, Bainbridge curiously still defends directors’ ultimate 
116 According to Blair and Stout’s model, “boards exist not to protect share-
holders per se, but to protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the members 
of the corporate ‘team,’ including shareholders, managers, rank and file employ-
ees, and possibly other groups, such as creditors.” Id. at 253. 
117 For a more recent and detailed exposition of this position by the latter 
author, see generally LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW 
PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE 
PUBLIC (2012). 
118 See Blair & Stout, supra note 114, at 287–88. On this, see also Lynn A. 
Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163,
174 (2008). 
119 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 106; William W. Bratton & Michael L. 
Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 
(2010); Marc T. Moore & Antoine Rebérioux, Revitalizing the Institutional Roots 
of Anglo-American Corporate Governance, 40 ECON. & SOC’Y 84 (2011); Simon 
Deakin, The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking Property Rights, Govern-
ance and Sustainability in the Business Enterprise, 37 QUEEN’S L.J. 339 (2012); 
Bernard S. Sharfman, Why Proxy Access is Harmful to Corporate Governance,
37 J. CORP. L. 387 (2012); STOUT, supra note 117; COLIN MAYER, FIRM COM-
MITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO RESTORE TRUST 
IN IT (1st ed. 2013). 
120 See generally Bainbridge, supra note 106; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Re-
sponse, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1735 (2006); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008). 
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fiduciary responsibility to further shareholders’ interests.121 Sig-
nificantly, though, he asserts that directors are expected by law 
to maximize shareholder wealth in their capacity as, lexically supe-
rior, “[p]latonic guardian[s]” of shareholders, as opposed to, lexically 
inferior, agents of the latter group.122
 More recently, Zohar Goshen and Richard Squire’s principal 
costs theory123 has sought to dispute directly the abovementioned 
notion that corporate governance, and, by implication, corporate law, 
is, and should be, focused exclusively on mitigating agency costs im-
posed by recalcitrant managerial “agent[s]” on their shareholder 
“principal[s]”.124 Adopting a not dissimilar analytical framework to 
those of Blair/Stout and Bainbridge, Goshen and Squire add a 
significant further dimension to the orthodox agency costs 
landscape in the form of their novel concept of “principal costs”.125
According to Goshen and Squire, whereas agency costs are the 
losses incurred by the firm and, in turn, its shareholders due to 
suboptimal managerial decisions, principal costs conversely 
comprise the ultimate losses to shareholders, deriving from 
suboptimal decisions and control strategies on the part of 
shareholders themselves.126
 Such self-imposed shareholder losses can arise either from 
incompetent, misjudged, or ill-informed interventions by in-
vestors in a company’s internal business affairs, so-called 
“principal competence costs”,127 or else by individual investors’ 
pursuit of certain actions, such as short-term profit focused 
activism, that are detrimental to long-term firm—and, ulti-
mately, shareholder—wealth, so-called “[p]rincipal conflict costs.”128
Goshen and Squire posit that any optimal corporate governance 
121 See Bainbridge, supra note 106, at 574; Stephen M. Bainbridge, In De-
fense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green,
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423–24 (1993). 
122 Bainbridge explains how his director primacy model of corporate law “treats 
the board of directors as a sort of Platonic guardian whose power devolves from 
the set of contracts comprising the corporation as a whole rather than solely from 
shareholders.” Bainbridge, supra note 106, at 577. 
123 On this, see generally Goshen & Squire, supra note 101. 
124 Id. at 778–83. 
125 See id. at 796–805. 
126 Id. at 770–71. 
127 Id. at 786–88. 
128 See id. at 791–93. 
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structure should be designed to minimize not just agency costs, but 
“total control costs,”129 which they define as “the sum of principal
costs and agent costs.”130 In essence, this necessitates investors 
being willing to tolerate, in appropriate instances, firms’ adoption 
of governance structures, including, amongst other things, 
DCSs,131 which are designed to limit the involvement of share-
holders in complex or contentious business affairs, with a view to 
forestalling potentially irresponsible or misguided actions on 
their part.132
 DCS structures are also held out by their advocates as a 
crucial countermeasure for many listed firms against the pervasive 
influence of financialization over modern U.S. corporate governance 
practices.133 In this regard, dual-class and other differential voting 
structures can be said to provide a degree of strategic breathing 
space for corporate controllers from the intense pressure exerted 
by quarterly financial reporting hurdles.134 Of course, listed firms 
with DCS structures remain subject to the same periodic disclo-
sure requirements as any other issuer of SEC-registered equity 
129 Id. at 770. 
130 Id.
131 Id. at 806–07. 
132 An alternative but related rationalization of insider-oriented corporate 
ownership structures has recently been advanced in the form of Goshen and 
Hamdani’s “idiosyncratic vision” theory. Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Cor-
porate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 576 (2016). The 
essential suggestion here is that, where investors and entrepreneurs “hold dif-
ferent beliefs concerning the best way to .... maximize the firm’s expected re-
turn,” a DCS structure or other concentrated control structure can be an effective 
means of ensuring “that the firm will pursue [the entrepreneur’s] idiosyncratic 
vision even against the investors’ objections.” See id. On this, see also Eric Van 
den Steen, Disagreement and the Allocation of Control, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
385, 385 (2010). 
133 On the financialization of corporate governance norms and practices, see 
generally Paddy Ireland, Financialization and Corporate Governance, 60 N. IR.
LEGAL Q. 1 (2009); JULIE FROUD ET AL., FINANCIALIZATION AND STRATEGY: NARRA-
TIVE AND NUMBERS (2006); MICHEL AGLIETTA & ANTOINE REBÉRIOUX, COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE ADRIFT: A CRITIQUE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE (2005); William 
Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology 
for Corporate Governance, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 13 (2000). 
134 See Sharfman, supra note 4, at 14–15. 
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securities.135 However, the adverse consequences of management 
failing to conform to consensus earnings estimates are almost cer-
tain to be less severe than in the case of one share/one vote issu-
ers, given the effective immunity enjoyed by multiple vote holding 
controllers from outside challenge to their incumbency on the part 
of proxy contestants.136
 The insulation from short-term stock market pressures that 
DCSs purportedly provide is said to be valuable not just in terms 
of creating a greater scope for the formation and implementation 
of long-term business strategies, but also insofar as it can encour-
age more firms to go public at a relatively early stage in their busi-
ness life cycle.137 This is because DCSs and other insider-oriented 
voting structures enable entrepreneurial founders to “cash out” their 
initial equity investment in the business at the IPO stage so as to 
gain a market “reward” for their start-up efforts, but—crucially—
without being compelled to give up control of their venture to 
outsiders in order to achieve this.138 It has been claimed that, in 
turn, permitting DCS structures may help to counteract the pro-
gressive decline in listed companies that has occurred over recent 
decades, by encouraging more companies that would otherwise 
135 See id. at 9. 
136 On this, see id. at 11–12. As articulated in Google’s IPO documentation 
from 2004:  
Because of our dual class structure, our founders, executives and 
employees will continue to be able to control all matters sub-
mitted to our stockholders for approval even if they come to own 
significantly less than 50% of the shares of our outstanding com-
mon stock. This concentrated control could discourage others 
from initiating any potential merger, takeover or other change of 
control transaction that other stockholders may view as beneficial.  
Google Inc., Registration Statement 89 (Form S-1) (Apr. 29, 2004), https:// 
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/ds1.htm#toc 
16167_10 [https://perma.cc/JF8X-YZGN]. 
137 A recent paper by Lemley and McCreary underscores the multiple social 
benefits of providing enhanced incentives to founder entrepreneurs to opt for 
an IPO as the preferred method for “exiting” their start-up investment, instead 
of the increasingly more common exit strategy of subjecting the firm to private 
acquisition by an industry incumbent. See Mark A. Lemley & Andrew McCreary, 
Exit Strategy 15, 48–49 (Stan. L. & Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 542, 2019). 
The authors cite DCS structures, amongst other things, as a potentially signif-
icant structural driver in this regard. See id. at 22–23.
138 Id. at 8, 14; see Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1060–61. 
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remain private or submit to private equity ownership, largely to 
avoid the adverse repercussions of pervasive stock market scru-
tiny, to remain in the public market domain.139
 It is noteworthy that those who advocate facilitating DCS 
structures typically do not suggest that DCS structures will become 
universal, or even the majoritarian norm, within the listed company 
community.140 Rather, their rate of adoption is expected to depend—
as at present—on their compatibility with the specific corporate 
governance challenges faced at the micro, in other words, individual 
firm, level.141 In this regard, Goshen and Squire explain how any 
firm’s optimal balance between the dual concerns of agency cost and 
principal cost mitigation will depend on a range of micro level factors 
including “the firm’s business strategy, its industry, and the personal 
characteristics of its investors and managers.”142 Since “each firm 
has a distinct division of control rights that minimizes total con-
trol costs,” it purportedly follows that “law’s proper role is to allow 
firms to select from a wide range of governance structures, rather 
than to mandate some structures and ban others.”143
 On the above premise, Goshen and Squire attribute the de-
cision by any firm to adopt, or, conversely, refrain from adopting, 
a differential voting structure to the relative complexity and 
specialism of its business affairs.144 Accordingly, in instances 
where investors’ informational expertise deficit vis-à-vis entre-
preneurs or other corporate insiders is especially pronounced, it 
arguably makes sense for investors to adopt a DCS structure to 
mitigate the risk of principal costs, and especially principal com-
petence costs, arising.145 While such an arrangement inevitably 
risks occasioning increased agency costs in the investor-controller 
139 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1061. 
140 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 101, at 807. 
141 For instance, Goshen and Squire explain how:  
[t]he use of a dual-class share structure is a good illustration of 
the firm-specific nature of corporate governance, as the structure 
may be well-suited to firms in complex industries such as in-
formation technology (e.g., Google, Facebook, and LinkedIn), or 
to firms whose outside shareholders recognize management’s 
unique skills and strategic vision (e.g., Berkshire Hathaway).  
Id.
142 Id. at 771. 
143 Id.
144 See id. at 771–72. 
145 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 101, at 770, 772. 
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relation, any ensuing losses for shareholders will be tolerated 
insofar as they are outweighed by the corresponding saving in 
principal costs that the DCS structure brings about.146 In this 
instance, an overall net positive wealth effect for shareholders is 
therefore likely to ensue.147
 Those who claim that shareholder voting structures should be 
determined in the above bespoke way tend to rely on the presumptive 
efficiency of micro level private ordering.148 This position entails 
putting considerable faith in stock market pricing mechanisms to 
detect and discount effectively the relative value of restricted vot-
ing rights to a DCS firm’s common, single-vote, shareholders.149
The underlying belief is that so long as relevant firms remain sub-
ject to the traditional securities law principle of full disclosure,150
especially at the IPO stage151 then investors will be equipped to 
pass reasonably prudent judgment on the continuing suitability 
of their governance, including voting, arrangements.152 The flip 
side to this argument is that any attempt by regulators to impose 
a standardized governance norm with respect to shareholder voting 
structures, for example, a mandatory one-share/one-vote rule, will 
run the risk of precluding many firms from adopting more suitable 
146 See id.
147 However, the authors also acknowledge that, for the same reasons, DCS 
structures will likely not be optimal for firms in which those characteristics are 
not present. See id. at 771–72. 
148 See Dennis P. Sheehan, Comment, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and 
Dual Class Equity, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 315, 317 (Randall 
K. Morck ed., 2000). 
149 According to Sheehan, “the fact ... that new shareholders willingly buy into 
firms in which wealth consequences are not proportional to voting rights .... [sug-
gests] that these new shareholders buy into these firms at prices that protect 
them from being exploited.” See id.
150 In the words of one especially eloquent commentary on the matter, “[t]he 
American polity has ... carried on a vigorous romance with the idea that the free 
flow of information is a potent remedy for social and political ills .... perhaps, 
because it meshes so comfortably with the principle of individual choice that 
permeates our conventional social philosophy.” Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., The 
SEC and the New Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 50, 50 (1977). 
151 Goshen asserts in this regard that “[w]ith many sophisticated parties, 
the IPO market does not suffer from negotiation failures.” Zohar Goshen, Against
Mandatory Sunset for Dual Class Firms, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG
(Jan. 2, 2019), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/01/02/against-manda 
tory-sunset-for-dual-class-firms [https://perma.cc/AUV2-E84Q].  
152 See Stevenson, supra note 150. 
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alternative arrangements in this regard, which may well be bet-
ter suited to mitigate total control costs under the unique circum-
stances at hand.153
2. The Case for Prohibition 
 By contrast, critics of DCS structures, and, likewise, other 
types of differential voting structure, typically view such arrange-
ments as a significant source of agency costs between multi-vote-
holding controllers and their common, single vote, stockholding 
peers.154 Specifically, it is alleged that DCS enables multi-vote-
holders to maintain effective control over the firm despite owning 
only a minority of cash flow rights, thereby causing a significant 
bifurcation between, on the one hand, their scope of managerial 
and/or governance power, and on the other, their corresponding 
incentive to exercise that power in a diligent and entrepreneuri-
ally effective manner.155
153 Goshen and Squire claim that “[b]ecause the governance structure that 
minimizes control costs varies by firm, lawmakers—including courts, regula-
tors, and legislators—should avoid one-size-fits-all solutions.” See Goshen & 
Squire, supra note 101, at 774. They argue that: 
 [I]n the absence of clear market failures, lawmakers should 
presume the efficiency of each firm’s chosen governance struc-
ture,” and thus “should seek to grow rather than shrink the menu 
of governance-structure options .... [by] allow[ing] each firm to tai-
lor its governance structure in the manner that strikes the firm-
specific optimal balance between principal costs and agent costs.  
Id. at 774, 829. 
154 See, e.g., BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 56, at 295–96; Bebchuk & Kastiel, 
supra note 12, at 596–99. 
155 For instance, Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis argue that “[t]he [con-
trolling minority shareholder] structure lacks the principal mechanisms that 
limit agency costs in other ownership structures” in that “[u]nlike in [dispersed 
ownership] structures, where controlling management may have little equity but 
can be displaced, the controllers of [controlling minority shareholder] companies 
face neither proxy contests nor hostile takeovers.” See BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 
56, at 301. The authors further assert that, “unlike in [controlling majority 
shareholder] structures, where controlling shareholders are entrenched but in-
ternalize most of the value effects of their decisions through their sharehold-
ings, [controlling minority shareholders] may hold a very small fraction of the 
cash-flow rights in their firms.” Id.
2020] DESIGNING DUAL-CLASS SUNSETS 125 
 In turn, the ensuing disparity between control and cash flow 
rights arguably incentivizes the controlling minority to expro-
priate private benefits of control from the firm while bearing only a 
limited part of the negative wealth effects of their behavior.156 Such 
private control benefits can potentially include shirking, nepo-
tism,157 receipt of exorbitant compensation and hubris-driven 
expansionism through, in the more egregious cases of controller 
self-dealing, related party transactions and appropriation of cor-
porate opportunities.158 The purported outcome is a classic moral 
hazard situation whereby controlling minorities are positioned to 
externalize the adverse repercussions of their self-benefitting 
actions, or inaction, on other investors, thereby affecting an un-
compensated net wealth transfer from common stockholders to 
multi-vote-holding controllers.159
In a similar vein, Bebchuk and Kastiel claim that “[t]he combination of en-
trenchment and limited equity holdings [in DCS companies] produces serious 
problems” insofar as “a controller with a minority equity stake may favor choices 
that increase the private benefits of control even if those choices substantially 
diverge from those of other public shareholders, and no threat of removal exists 
to prevent her from pursuing those interests.” See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note
12, at 602. They further posit that: “[t]his distortion of incentives becomes more 
severe when the controller of a dual-class company holds a smaller percentage 
of the company’s equity capital.” Id. at 602–03. By way of response, Goshen 
and Squire refer to critics such as Bebchuk as “[a]gency-cost essentialists—
who [erroneously in Goshen and Squire’s view] believe that the reduction of 
agency costs is the essential role of corporate law.” See Goshen & Squire, supra
note 101, at 775. 
156 See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
157 That is to say, appointing family members or other associates to execu-
tive positions instead of better qualified external candidates. See Morten 
Bennedsen et al., Inside the Family Firm: The Role of Families in Succession 
Decisions and Performance, 122 Q.J. ECON. 647, 648 (2007). 
158 Ronald W. Masulis et al., Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64 J.
FIN. 1697, 1722 (2009), referred to by Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 603. 
159 See BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 56, at 301. By contrast, in standard ma-
jority-controlled firms where there exists no such disparity between control 
and cash flow rights, controllers can be expected to bear a significant share of 
the adverse wealth effects of any expropriative or otherwise value reducing 
activities that they undertake vis-à-vis the firm. See id. DCS critics have ar-
gued, moreover, that the agency costs of DCS structures can be expected to 
increase exponentially as the proportion of cash flow rights held by a control-
ling minority decreases in relation to the corresponding percentage of voting 
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DCS structures are additionally criticized from the above 
perspective insofar as they remove controlling minorities from the 
discipline of the outside market for corporate control.160 This is 
because any prospective outside control-acquirer will be unable to 
gain majority voting control over the firm by gaining the equity 
or votes of the firm’s independent (non-controlling) shareholders 
alone.161 For this reason, DCSs (and other differential voting 
structures) have been criticized for arguably combining the worst 
features of orthodox blockholder and widely held corporate own-
ership systems, that is to say, providing the leeway for controller 
exploitation of private benefits of control that is traditionally as-
sociated with European and Asian style blockholder systems, 
with the absence of effective proprietary incentives on the part of 
controllers for which Anglo-American widely held systems are 
conventionally renowned for.162
 In addition, critics of DCS have contested the abovemen-
tioned claim by their academic champions that private ordering 
will ultimately produce efficient corporate voting structures, whether 
of the multi-class or one-share/one-vote variety.163 Those of an 
anti-DCS disposition have contrarily argued that private ordering 
is unlikely to lead to efficient governance outcomes because, even in 
instances where terminating a dual-class share structure (whether 
via an outright takeover of the firm or, alternatively, via the vol-
untary unification of the firm’s capital structure by its existing con-
troller) would enhance firm efficiency, any ensuing benefits for the 
incumbent controller are unlikely to compensate for the private 
benefits of control that she will consequently be required to forego.164
For this reason, it has been posited that controlling minorities 
cannot be trusted to make the determinative decision on whether 
rights. See id. at 310; Paul A. Gompers et al., Extreme Governance: An Analysis 
of Dual Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1084–85 
(2010), referred to by Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 603.
160 Kishore Eechambadi, The Dual Class Voting Structure, Associate Agency 
Issues, and a Path Forward, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 503, 515 (2017). 
161 Id. at 513. 
162 See BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 56, at 299; Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra 
note 12, at 602. 
163 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 612–13. 
164 See id. at 613. 
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to retain or dispense with a DCS structure midstream in a truly 
independent and disinterested manner.165
 DCS opponents further suggest that common stockholders 
are ill-equipped to make rational decisions on public companies’ 
individual capital structures, whether on an individual or collec-
tive basis.166 It is well known that coordination and collective ac-
tion problems can constrain the capacity of investors, both of an 
individual and institutional nature, to take informed decisions 
and actions with respect to complex firm-specific matters.167
There is consequent cause to question whether stock market pric-
ing mechanisms are sufficiently sensitive to individual corporate 
voting arrangements and other nuanced micro-level concerns.168
 In response to such claims, DCS advocates would likely point 
to the significant concentration of U.S. public company shareholding 
today,169 especially in the hands of the dominant “mega-mutual”170
fund providers such as Blackrock, State Street and Vanguard.171
They might additionally highlight the pervasive and centralized 
corporate governance influence wielded today by professional proxy 
advisory firms such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and 
165 See id. at 617. 
166 See, e.g., id. at 592. 
167 On the collective action problem generally as it affects decision-making 
and other firms of cooperative action within large business organizations and 
other social institutions, see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COL-
LECTIVE ACTION (1965); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVO-
LUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
168 On this, see Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate 
Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 791 (2006); Marc T. Moore, Private
Ordering and Public Policy: The Paradoxical Foundations of Corporate Con-
tractarianism, 34 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 693, 710 (2013). See generally L.A. 
Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1395 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate 
Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory 
Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989). 
169 See Berger, supra note 103, at 7. 
170 This term is attributable to Professor Bernard Sharfman. See Sharfman, 
supra note 4. 
171 Jonathan Guthrie, The Fallacy Behind the Rise of Passive Fund Man-
agement, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/1c4382c6-36 
cb-11ea-a6d3-9a26f8c3cba4 (last visited Oct. 30, 2020). 
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Glass, Lewis & Co.172 Indeed, on first reflection at least,173 both the 
above developments would appear to have rendered the traditional 
Berle-Means dichotomy174 of strong managers and weak owners175
somewhat redundant within the contemporary corporate govern-
ance and stock market environments.176
 DCS opponents have been quick to point out, though, that—
market concentration factors aside—the so-called mega-mutuals 
are for the most part comprised of passive index-linked funds, which 
either actively track a particular market index or have their per-
formance periodically benchmarked against any such index.177
The managers of such funds therefore have limited incentives to 
engage in ongoing monitoring and evaluation of investee firms’ 
micro-level governance matters.178 Furthermore, the inevitable 
resource limitations of proxy advisory firms mean that they are 
likewise constrained with respect to their firm-specific monitoring 
activities, causing them typically to focus their energies on specific 
blacklisted firms and personnel that pose extraordinary 
172 On this, see Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or 
Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 871 (2010); Letter from Bernard S. Sharfman, 
Chairman of the Main St. Invs. Advisory Counc., to Vanessa Countryman, Sec’y, 
SEC (Dec. 20, 2019) (File No. s7-22-19), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-22-19 
/s72219-6571096-201082.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR5E-UG3S]. 
173 For an alternative argument, to the effect that the relatively passive, 
index-linked investment practices of the major U.S. mutual fund providers have 
actually exacerbated managerial accountability problems in publicly traded firms, 
see Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Gov-
ernance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2030 (2019). 
174 See generally Adolf A. Berle & Gardner Means, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
175 On this dichotomy (and the historico-political foundations thereof), see 
generally Mark J. Roe, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL 
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994). 
176 On the gradual power shift from managers to shareholders that purport-
edly occurred within U.S. public companies generally throughout the early part 
of the present century, see generally Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Embattled 
CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987 (2010). 
177 See Sharfman, supra note 4, at 13. 
178 Winden & Baker, supra note 24, at 10. 
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governance and/or accountability concerns, arguably at the ex-
pense of tracking the many less egregiously problematic cases.179
 Allied to the above collective action constraints is the vex-
ing dilemma that typically confronts those outside investors who 
are faced with an otherwise highly attractive dual-class IPO. 
While a new issuer’s insider-oriented voting structure might pose 
accountability and other governance concerns for prospective pur-
chasers of common (single-vote) stock, such worries might con-
ceivably be outweighed by individual investors’ fear of missing out 
on what may well turn out to be a collectively popular (or “hot”180)
IPO.181 It follows that, in the absence of reliable information 
about how their fellow investors will react to the IPO in question, 
each individual investor will likely be reluctant to defect from the 
prevailing herd mentality irrespective of their continuing concerns 
about the robustness of the relevant firm’s capital structure.182
 Accordingly, from the perspective of DCS critics, the com-
bined effect of the above factors is to constrain considerably the 
receptiveness of stock market pricing mechanisms to the presence 
or absence of DCSs (and other differential voting structures) within 
individual public issuers relative to orthodox one-share/one-vote 
arrangements.183 This in turn purportedly limits the propensity of 
private ordering to operate as an effective surrogate for mandatory 
state or exchange driven regulation of corporate capital struc-
tures.184 The anti-DCS school thus seeks to establish an essen-
tially paternalistic rationale for some form(s) of public-regulatory 
intervention in private ordering of capital structures,185 in the 
179 On the limitations of proxy advisors as firm-specific monitors, see generally
Marc T. Moore, “Whispering Sweet Nothings”: The Limitations of Informal Con-
formance in UK Corporate Governance, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 95 (2009). 
180 This term is attributable to Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 591. 
181 See Reddy, supra note 60, at 26. 
182 See Winden & Baker, supra note 24, at 9. 
183 See id. at 10. 
184 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Cor-
porate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1620 (1989). 
185 On the paternalistic nature of Anglo-American corporate law generally, 
see MARC T. MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE, chs. 
6–7 (2013); Marc T. Moore, The De-Privatisation of Anglo-American Corporate 
130 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:093 
interest of protecting vulnerable or misguided outside investors 
from exploitation at the hands of overreaching entrepreneurial 
controllers.186
C. The Shift Towards Sunsets 
Until recently, the debate on the relative merits of DCS versus 
one-share/one-vote structures has been largely polarized, with 
the pivotal normative issue being a fairly straightforward one: 
that is, whether DCS should freely be permitted within publicly 
traded firms (subject only to full disclosure and private ordering) 
or else prohibited by appropriate regulatory means.187 However, 
the progressive maturing of this debate has seen a corresponding 
convergence of both sides’ respective argumentative positions.188
Consequently, advocates and critics of DCS have, for the most 
part, commonly come to accept (albeit with different degrees of 
enthusiasm from one another) that any form of outright prohibi-
tion on the use of differential voting structures in publicly traded 
firms is probably an unrealistic aspiration for the anti-DCS 
school.189 In turn, academic and policy discussions have in large 
part shifted away from the general binary question of whether 
DCS should be permitted or prohibited, and more on the specific 
middle-ground concerns of: (i) whether such insider-oriented vot-
ing structures should have an indefinite or contingent life span; and 
(ii) in the latter instance, precisely how (or, more accurately, 
when) the eventual transformation of any multi-vote shares to 
common (single-vote) status should take place.190 Hence the cur-
rent pertinence of so-called “sunset” provisions.191
 Sunsets are unquestionably a vogue notion within the U.S. 
corporate governance world today.192 For instance, in October 
2018, the influential Council of Institutional Investors (CII), 
which currently represents 140 major institutional investors with 
Law?, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, ch. 2 (Roman Tomasic 
ed., 2016). 
186 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 627. 
187 See id. at 590. 
188 See Eechambadi, supra note 160, at 511. 
189 See id.
190 See id. at 531–32. 
191 See id. at 531. 
192 See id. at 526. 
2020] DESIGNING DUAL-CLASS SUNSETS 131 
a combined asset base worth approximately $4 trillion,193 publicly 
(albeit, as yet, unsuccessfully) lobbied both the New York Stock 
Exchange and NASDAQ with a view to persuading their respec-
tive authorities to introduce a universal requirement for septen-
nial time-based sunset provisions,194 applicable to all new DCS 
issuers as a mandatory precondition of listing on each of those 
markets.195 In a similar vein, ISS’s current proxy voting policy 
with respect to multi-class capital structures states that “[n]o 
sunset period of more than seven years from the date of the 
IPO will be considered to be reasonable” from an investor 
193 See About CII, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS., https://www.cii.org 
/about [https://perma.cc/VR5G-XDXA]. 
194 On this, see infra Section II.A. At the same time, the Chartered Financial 
Analyst Institute has expressly been “urging” exchanges to consider mandat-
ing time-based sunsets of up to five years’ duration as an “absolute maximum.” 
See DUAL-CLASS SHARES IN ASIA PACIFIC, supra note 33, at 5. 
195 See Letter from Ash Williams, Chair, Council of Institutional Invs. et al., to 
Elizabeth King, Chief Regul. Officer, Intercontinental Exch. Inc. (Oct. 24, 
2018), https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2018/20 
181024%20NYSE%20Petition%20on%20Multiclass%20Sunsets%20FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6KFX-EA3J]; Letter from Ash Williams, Chair, Council of In-
stitutional Invs. et al., to John Zecca, Senior Vice President, NASDAQ Stock Mar-
ket (Oct. 24, 2018) (on file with CII.ORG), https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and 
_advocacy/correspondence/2018/20181024%20NASDAQ%20Petition%20on%20 
Multiclass%20Sunsets%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQT9-V6H4] [herein-
after NASDAQ Letter]. On this, see Govindarajan et al., supra note 18. The CII 
made an additional appeal to the Delaware State Bar Association to amend 
Delaware General Corporation Law so as to prohibit any Delaware corporation 
from adopting a multi-class common structure after an initial seven-year post-
IPO period. See Letter from Ken Bertsch, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional 
Invs. et al., to Henry E. Gallagher, Council Chair, Corp. L. Section, Del. State 
Bar Ass’n (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/corre 
spondence/2019/September%2013%202019%20Final%20DGCL%20letter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G2W9-LM57] [hereinafter Delaware Letter]. After giving due 
consideration to the CII’s request, the Council of the Corporation Law Section 
of the Delaware State Bar Association unsurprisingly opted to refrain from imple-
menting the CII’s desired reform. See id.; see also Letter from Henry E. Gallagher, 
Council Chair, Corp. L. Section. Del. State Bar Ass’n, to Ken Bertsch, Exec. Dir., 
Council of Institutional Invs. et al. (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.cii.org/files/1 
-28-2020%20Letter%20to%20CII%20(05512328xCCC1C).pdf [https://perma.cc 
/PB4G-ZDWN].
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perspective196 Indeed, the sunset issue has come to dominate the 
policy agenda in respect of DCS to such an extent lately that, in 
the words of current (at time of writing) SEC Commissioner 
Robert Jackson, the principal concern in this regard today is no 
longer “whether dual-class ownership is always good or bad.”197
According to Jackson, the energies of commentators have instead 
been absorbed principally in seeking to answer the more focused 
question of “whether dual-class structures, once adopted, should 
last forever” such that “corporate insiders maintain outsized con-
trol in perpetuity.”198 In the context of the present discussion, this 
is a telling observation that emphasizes the exigency of the mat-
ter at hand. 
 From the above facts alone, it should be clear that concern 
for dual-class sunsets have increased exponentially in recent 
times.199 Notwithstanding these important developments, though, 
it is fair to say that sunset provisions are still a long way from 
becoming a dominant feature of DCS structures in general.200 In-
deed, it is curious that almost half of companies listing on U.S. 
stock markets over the past fifteen years with DCS adopted a per-
petual DCS structure containing no sunset provision in any shape 
or form.201 Admittedly, only 14% of dual-class IPOs carried out on 
U.S. markets in 2017 had perpetual DCS structures, which—at 
least on the face of things—suggests a notable drift from the for-
mer norm.202 However, any such conclusion is tempered by the 
fact that only one-third of dual-class IPOs conducted in 2018 in-
volved time-based sunset provisions, with the majority continuing 
to be non-time-contingent.203
 The somewhat truncated spread of sunsets to date is un-
surprising. After all, there still exists considerable skepticism from 
196 ISS 2019(1), supra note 25, at 6; see also Andrew W. Winden, Sunrise,
Sunset: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Dual-Class Stock Struc-
tures, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 852, 857 (2018). 
197 Jackson, supra note 1. 
198 Id. (emphasis in original). 
199 See supra notes 187–98 and accompanying text. 
200 See Jackson, supra note 1. 
201 See id.
202 See id.
203 See Sharfman, Sunsets, supra note 97, at 7 n.29. 
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opponents of DCS as to whether sunset provisions will prove to 
be the corporate governance panacea that they are frequently 
held out as.204 In theory, a suitably designed sunset provision is 
expected to strike an effective balance between, on the one hand, 
upholding long-term managerial accountability, and, on the other 
hand, mitigating short-term stock market pressures on man-
agement at critical points in the corporate life cycle.205 However, 
striking this balance in practice is a considerably more difficult 
governance task than it might first appear.206 Additionally, there 
is the concern that, even to the extent stock market pricing 
mechanisms are sensitive to firm-specific governance factors such 
as the presence or absence of DCS, it is at least questionable 
whether they are responsive to such granular and nuanced con-
siderations as whether a given DCS structure is perpetual or sun-
setting in nature.207 This is not to mention the separate (albeit 
interrelated) issue of the precise nature of any sunset provision 
that happens to be in place, which adds even further to the valu-
ation complexities.208
 Insofar as there exists doubt as to whether the presence (or, 
conversely, absence) of a sunset provision within (or from) a given 
DCS structure is likely to elicit a corresponding market pricing dif-
ferential, it is unsurprising that many entrepreneurs and investors 
embarking on a dual-class listing have been either reticent or am-
bivalent about adopting this particular DCS component.209 On the 
other hand, the steadily growing take-up of sunset provisions 
within recent dual-class listings suggests that a reasonable degree 
of investor demand for such protections does indeed exist.210 In any 
event, the complex, uncertain and fluctuating nature of this issue 
today suggests that a degree of caution on the part of prospective 
204 See Winden & Baker, supra note 24, at 8. 
205 Eechambadi, supra note 160, at 531–32. 
206 See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
207 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 622–23. 
208 On the questionability of stock market pricing of firm-specific corporate 
governance characteristics, see generally supra notes 177–79 and accompany-
ing text. 
209 See Sharfman, supra note 4, at 19. 
210 See id. at 2 n.6. 
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market regulators would be salutary here.211 This is with a view 
to preserving meaningful scope for private ordering at the indi-
vidual firm level. Moreover, such a deferential (or “light-touch”)212
regulatory stance would appear exigent both on the more general 
issue of whether DCS structures should be perpetual or sunset-
ting in nature, and, equally, with respect to the more specific 
question of how best (if at all) to calibrate a suitable market-wide 
regulatory requirement for sunset provision. Accordingly, it is to 
the latter challenge that we now turn our attention. 
II. THE THREE PRINCIPAL MODELS OF SUNSET PROVISION
A. The Time-Centered Sunset Model 
 Of the various structural forms of DCS sunset provision 
that have been trialed, undoubtedly the most popular—on the 
investor side at least—has been the time-centered model.213 In 
essence, a time-based sunset provision is a bespoke charter or by-
law provision that causes a DCS company’s multi-voting shares 
automatically to convert (or “sunset”) to single-vote shares after 
the passing of a predetermined period of time, unless the com-
pany’s existing single-vote shareholders214 affirmatively resolve 
otherwise by way of a majority class vote to this effect.215 At the 
individual firm level, specific sunset time triggers can vary from a 
211 See supra Section I.B. 
212 On the effectiveness of so-called “soft” or “light-touch” financial regula-
tion generally under appropriate circumstances (as viewed from a comparative 
trans-Atlantic perspective), see Moore, supra note 179, at 101 n.28. See also
Ferran’s explanation:  
The construction of a regulatory architecture relating to com-
panies which is modern and suitable for a competitive economy 
depends crucially on striking the right balance between giving 
business the flexibility to operate effectively in dynamic and 
internationally orientated markets and, at the same time, giv-
ing investors confidence that they are legally protected against 
exploitation and underperformance by corporate management. 
Eilis Ferran, Corporate Law, Codes and Social Norms—Finding the Right Regu-
latory Combination and Institutional Structure, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 381, 385 (2001). 
213 Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1079, 1086. 
214 Or, at least, those single-vote shareholders who have no material affilia-
tion with the DCS holder. On this, see Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 618. 
215 Id.
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low of three years in duration (such as in the case of EVO payments) 
to a high of twenty years (for example Workday).216 Amongst other 
notable examples, Groupon has a sunset trigger of five years from 
IPO (which converted in 2016) and Fitbit has a twelve-year trig-
ger (which will convert in 2027).217 Two leading academic cham-
pions of time-based sunsets, meanwhile, have suggested ten or 
fifteen years as potentially appropriate trigger points for DCS 
companies to adopt in this regard.218
 Time-based sunset provisions have unquestionably in-
creased in popularity in recent years.219 SEC filings from 2018 
show that twenty-four U.S.-listed companies adopted time-based 
sunset provisions within their respective charters or bylaws that 
year.220 Moreover, no fewer than twenty-six percent of dual-class 
IPOs carried out on U.S. markets in 2017 contained time-based 
sunset clauses, with the mean sunset period having reportedly fallen 
to 9.5 years that year from 10.3 years in 2016.221 Meanwhile, the 
Council of Institutional Investors has recently endorsed time-based 
sunsets as a “second best” option for newly listing companies, aside 
the purported “first best” option of adopting one-share/one-vote 
immediately from IPO.222 And, as remarked on above, the Council 
has also petitioned the NYSE and NASDAQ to introduce man-
datory listing rules requiring that any multi-vote shares auto-
matically sunset after seven years or less.223 NASDAQ has 
216 See DUAL-CLASS SHARES IN ASIA PACIFIC, supra note 33, at 58–59. 
217 COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS. (CII), TIME-BASED SUNSET APPROACHES 
TO DUAL CLASS STOCK (Jul. 13, 2018), https://www.cii.org/files/2-14-18%20 
Time-based%20Sunsets.pdf [https://perma.cc/BH3J-4EDR] [hereinafter CII 
TIME-BASED SUNSET].
218 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 626. 
219 See id. at 618. 
220 CII TIME-BASED SUNSET, supra note 217. 
221 CII DUAL-CLASS IPO, supra note 3. 
222 See Dual Class Stock, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS., https://www.cii 
.org/dualclass_stock [https://perma.cc/2KJN-KCEN].
223 Id. Although, in a moderate concession to firm-specific flexibility, the 
Council has further proposed in its recommendation to the exchanges that any 
multi-class issuer’s initial sunset term should be extendable by one single fur-
ther seven-year term, which would be conditional on the vote of a majority of 
ordinary (that is non-multiple-voting) shareholders to this effect. See Ken Bertsch, 
Amy Borrus & Jeff Mahoney, Petition to NYSE on Multiclass Sunset Provisions,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 2, 2018), https:// 
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predictably been resistant to this proposal, presumably in the 
belief that it will undermine its attractiveness as a listing venue 
for innovative hi-tech firms.224 However, the NYSE has shown a 
tentative willingness at least to consider the CII’s request, although 
at the time of writing no changes to its rules have consequently 
been proposed.225
 Advocates of time-based sunsets typically point to empirical 
evidence which avers that, whereas U.S.-listed companies with 
perpetual and sunsetting DCS structures exhibit similar IPO 
valuations, over the longer term those with a perpetual DCS struc-
ture tend to exhibit significantly lower equity valuations than 
those with some form of built-in sunset.226 One suggested reason 
for this delayed disparity in valuations is the tendency of DCS 
structures to “lock in” founder control, in the sense of insulating 
founding entrepreneurs (who are typically the holders of multi-
vote shares) from subsequent challenge to their incumbency 
emanating from the market for control.227 This is because a cor-
porate founder whose multi-vote shares enable her to retain ma-
jority (or even near-majority) voting control after IPO simply can-
not unilaterally be displaced from her controlling position by way 
of hostile tender offer or proxy contest, whether at the instigation 
of a competitor firm, private equity fund or activist investor.228
The outcome of this, as DCS critics would seek to portray it, is an 
effective corporate dictatorship whereby the continuing fortunes 
of outside investors (typically holding only minority single-vote 
shares) are left at the whim of overbearing and unpredictable con-
trollers, to whom shareholder value creation may well have be-
come a secondary consideration at best.229
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/02/petition-to-nyse-on-multiclass-sunset-provi 
sions/ [https://perma.cc/U87Y-KTBZ]. 
224 Coffee, supra note 6.  
225 Id.
226 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 1. 
227 See DUAL-CLASS SHARES IN ASIA PACIFIC, supra note 33, at 10. 
228 See id. at 2. 
229 Advocates of time-based sunsets have highlighted the high-profile exam-
ple of Sumner Redstone, who indirectly retains a minority controlling stake 
(via multiple-vote stock) in ViacomCBS Inc. despite being of limited mental 
capacity due to dementia and memory loss. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra
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 The harmful economic effects of manifest controller unac-
countability in DCS companies are said to be particularly pronounced 
in the very high technology industries where DCS structures tend 
to be most commonly observed in practice.230 The purported danger 
is that in such dynamic and fast-changing product market sectors, 
once successful ideas can very quickly become outmoded.231 In turn, 
initially successful startups can rapidly stagnate in the absence 
of a constant flow of fresh ideas and challenges to established busi-
ness strategies.232 Relatedly, whereas a relatively young company at 
the typically volatile post-IPO stage might arguably benefit from 
the strong and insulated leadership that a DCS structure permits, 
this is unlikely to be the case once that company matures further 
down the line, at which point controller unaccountability will argua-
bly become a more elevated concern for investors.233
 It is noteworthy that those commentators who take a less 
sanguine view of the supposed general merits of time-based sunsets 
tend to be hostile not to the time-centered sunset model itself, but 
rather only to the notion that it should be enforced as a universal 
note 12, at 587–89. See generally Elizabeth Winkler, Can Super-Voting Stocks 
Survive the CBS Challenge?, WALL ST. J. (May 15, 2018). Although the signifi-
cant legal and corporate governance ramifications of the prolonged Redstone/Via-
com affair are undeniable, it must nonetheless be acknowledged that this is a 
truly extraordinary scenario which is unlikely to recur in future with any degree 
of frequency. Moreover, the relevant companies’ continuing combined market 
capitalization of approximately $25 billion arguably puts recent events into 
context to some extent. See Claire Atkinson, CBS and Viacom Merge to Form 
$30 Billion Media Company, NBC NEWS (Aug. 13, 2019, 2:12 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/cbs-viacom-merge-form-30 
-billion-media-company-n1041306 [https://perma.cc/5VH4-2KZ3]. Accordingly, in 
the present author’s belief it would be overly hasty to ground a case for general 
regulatory restriction of DCS usage on the experience of this peculiar episode 
alone. 
230 See DUAL-CLASS SHARES IN ASIA PACIFIC, supra note 33, at 34. 
231 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 589. 
232 See id. at 589, 605. 
233 Id. at 612. Bebchuk and Kastiel explain that “as time passes from the 
IPO, there is a growing risk that a dual-class structure will become value de-
creasing and that public investors will find themselves subject to an inefficient 
structure with significant governance risks and costs.” Id. at 630. In the au-
thors’ belief, it therefore follows that “even those who believe that dual-class 
structures are often efficient at the time of the IPO, and the period following 
it, should have substantial concerns about dual-class structures that provide 
perpetual or lifetime control.” Id.
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regulatory norm.234 However, critics of mandated time-based sun-
sets typically have no objection, but contrarily, tend to be favorably 
disposed to the idea of such provisions being introduced on an ad hoc 
basis via firm-specific private ordering.235 Their essential contention, 
thus, is not that time-based sunsets are inherently problematic 
from a corporate governance or business performance standpoint.236
Rather, it is simply that for stock exchanges or other regulatory 
authorities to deny individual issuers the free choice in this regard 
is a paternalistic intrusion on the contractual freedom of their in-
vestors and managers, who should arguably be at liberty to deter-
mine this complex matter subjectively in accordance with their 
own prudential and practical judgment,237 whether at IPO stage 
or thereafter.238
234 For example, Sharfman contends that while “the inclusion of a time-
based sunset provision makes some sense ... to come to the conclusion that they 
must be mandatory in every single dual class share structure one must go far-
ther and rebut the strong presumption that private ordering is value enhanc-
ing for shareholders.” Sharfman, Sunsets, supra note 97, at 6. Sharfman claims 
that “[t]o rebut this presumption, strong evidence of some sort of irrationality 
or market failure must be found when market participants refuse to include 
time-based sunset provisions in IPOs ... [and] such evidence does not exist.” Id.
235 Sharfman asserts that “[i]n sum, private ordering creates a strong pre-
sumption that the absence of time-based sunset provisions in many dual-class 
share structures is value enhancing and should not be interfered with by reg-
ulatory authorities.” Id. at 3. 
236 See id. at 10. 
237 As Mitts vividly puts it: 
Founders were paid by investors for the chance to bet on the 
next great American success story. On that view, the Council 
of Institutional Investors’ proposal that super-voting rights on 
dual class stock expire within at least seven years is a mis-
guided interference with a healthy form of private ordering. 
Joshua Mitts, Why Investors Pay So Much for Dual-Class Firms, COLUM. L. SCH.
BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 2, 2019), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/01/02 
/why-investors-pay-so-much-for-dual-class-firms/  [https://perma.cc/VX7X-QTQT]. 
238 As against this claim, though, Fisch and Solomon caution that “[t]o the 
extent that market forces are not sufficient to enable public shareholders to evaluate 
and price sunset provisions accurately at the IPO stage, it is unclear why their 
ability to do so midstream will be superior.” Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 
1085. Accordingly, they conclude that “the theory that public shareholders can 
properly evaluate whether to retain dual class at the time of the retention vote 
seems inconsistent with the basic premise of the dual class structure.” Id.
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B. The Ownership-Centered Sunset Model 
 While the time-centered sunset model would appear to have 
garnered the greatest share of support lately within the academic 
and investor communities,239 it is by no means the only available 
blueprint for DCS sunset design.240 Rather, there are two other 
common structural forms of sunset provision that likewise merit 
analysis here, namely the ownership-centered model241 and the 
transfer-centered model.242
 The former of those alternative models is part of a broader and 
more general category of sunset provisions known as “event-based” 
sunsets.243 As its title suggests, the essence of an event-based sun-
set is that it triggers on the occurrence of a particular event or 
development, irrespective of the specific point in time at which 
that event takes place.244 While event-based sunsets tend to lack 
the simplicity and uniformity of time-based structures, their rel-
ative complexity and malleability mean that they are capable of 
providing more tailored and circumstantially sensitive triggers 
than their time-centered counterparts.245
 In its more complex or nuanced forms, an event-based sunset 
trigger could be designed by reference to a particular financial 
performance outcome of the relevant firm, such that any multi-
vote shares convert automatically to single-vote shares (unless in-
dependently resolved otherwise) upon that firm transgressing a 
pre-specified negative performance threshold. The threshold for a 
performance-related sunset trigger could potentially be stipulated 
as a given level of earnings, sales or share price performance, mean-
ing that if the firm drops below this “floor” the multi-vote holder(s) 
automatically forfeits her formerly privileged governance status. Al-
ternatively, an event-based sunset could be designed so that it is 
triggered by the commission (or, in practice, revelation) of some 
form of impropriety on the part of the firm’s multi-vote-holding 
239 Id. at 1079, 1086. 
240 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 618. 
241 See generally id. at 620. 
242 See generally DUAL-CLASS SHARES IN ASIA PACIFIC, supra note 33, at 60. 
243 See id. at 69–71. 
244 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 619. Although if an event-based trigger 
is combined with a time-based trigger as part of a more complex dual-activated 
sunset, then timing considerations will of course be highly relevant in that case. 
245 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1086. 
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controller, which could vary from a criminal felony to any detected 
incidence of fraud, self-dealing or breach of fiduciary duty gener-
ally.246 The advantage of such event-based triggers is that they 
render the multi-vote holder’s continuing enjoyment of her privi-
leged governance status expressly conditional on her continuing 
regard (or, at least, absence of manifest disregard) for business 
performance and minority shareholder welfare. This can be con-
trasted favorably with the proverbial governance “blank check” that 
a perpetual DCS structure would appear to hand to unscrupulous 
or underperforming corporate controllers.247
 In a broadly similar vein to the above types of provision, 
ownership-based sunsets take effect on a multi-vote-holder’s cash 
flow interest in the firm dropping below a certain floor level, as spec-
ified typically in terms of a given percentage of the firm’s aggregate 
market capitalization (for example, 10% or 15%).248 The rationale 
underpinning ownership-based sunsets is that multi-vote-holding 
controllers should at all times have meaningful “skin in the game”: 
that is to say, a sufficiently high level of personal exposure to the 
firm’s ongoing economic fortunes to keep their interests broadly 
aligned with those of (single-vote-holding) minority shareholders.249
Conversely, the above “skin in the game” requirement is geared 
to mitigating the so-called “wedge”250 between a controller’s cash 
flow and corresponding voting rights that a DCS structure is said 
to engender, along with the associated agency costs that are ar-
guably inflicted on the firm’s outside investors as a result.251
 Ownership-based sunsets have not only proved appealing 
to investors at the individual firm level lately but have also been 
influential within the global financial-regulatory domain.252 For 
instance, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s recently liberalized 
listing rules now permit DCS structures subject (inter alia) to the 
continuing requirement that DCS holders, collectively, maintain 
at least a 10% underlying economic interest in the company’s 
246 Winden, supra note 196, at 926–27. 
247 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 604. 
248 Id. at 620. 
249 Id.
250 This term is attributable to Sharfman, supra note 4, at 6. 
251 Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1086. 
252 See HKEX, supra note 36, at 13. 
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equity.253 This is expressly with a view to ensuring “that, at the time 
of listing, the economic interest in the company held by all [DCS] 
beneficiaries, as a group, is large enough, in dollar terms, to align 
their interests to some extent with those of other shareholders.”254
However, this general rule is subject to potential relaxation in the 
case of especially large-scale issuers,255 where the Exchange deems 
the DCS holder’s lower percentage holding to still constitute “a very 
large amount in absolute dollar terms.”256
 In order to have any meaningful “bite,” an ownership-based 
sunset threshold must be set at a sufficiently high level.257 Other-
wise, the sunset provision risks being rendered superfluous on the 
premise that, should the multi-vote-holders’ proportionate equity 
interest in the firm drop below that level, their controlling interest 
will be negated in any event irrespective of the sunset’s presence.258
Unfortunately, as was demonstrated most pertinently in the case of 
Lyft’s 2019 dual-class IPO, this is very much a live issue with 
ownership-based sunsets.259 Consequently, there is cause to ques-
tion the practical effectiveness of such provisions, at least pending 
the formation of certain generally agreed market and/or regula-
tory norms as to what constitutes a materially significant level of 
economic exposure for corporate controllers.260
C. The Transfer-Centered Sunset Model 
 The third main structural form of sunset provision, namely 
the transfer-centered model, is also the least restrictive one from 
the perspective of a DCS company’s controllers.261 This is because, 
unlike the time- and ownership-centered models, it does not im-
pose any restrictions on controllers for as long as they retain 
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 This category includes (inter alia) any issuer with a market capitaliza-
tion in excess of HK$80 billion. Id.
256 Id.
257 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils of Small-Minority Con-
trollers, 107 GEO L. J. 1453, 1459 (2019) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Kastiel, Perils]. 
258 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, Lyft, supra note 60. 
259 See id.
260 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, Perils, supra note 257, at 1457. 
261 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 620. 
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ownership of their multiple-vote shares.262 The only constraint on 
a controller’s behavior arising from such a structure concerns her 
freedom to dispose of her shares either on death or retirement 
from the business, that is, at least on terms that guarantee the 
transferee the same voting entitlements previously enjoyed by the 
transferor.263
 The rationale behind a transfer-based sunset is that it 
protects the legitimate expectations of a DCS company’s (single-
vote-holding) minority shareholders, who may well have assented 
to their subordinate governance status in the firm based on their 
faith and/or trust in its incumbent (multi-vote-holding) control-
ler.264 It follows that, where the identity of the controller changes 
in one or other of the above instances, minority shareholders in 
effect endure a fundamental rewriting of their implicit govern-
ance contract with the firm in the absence of any corresponding 
compensation.
 Admittedly, where the transferee is an independent purchaser 
of the relevant shares in an arm’s length commercial transaction, 
there is at least the a priori assurance for minority shareholders 
that—since the new controller has purchased those shares for fair 
market value—she at least has a rational incentive to ensure that 
that value is preserved (and preferably enhanced) in the future.265
However, where the transferee has acquired the previous control-
ler’s shares unilaterally by way of familial inheritance, such a 
prudential motivation on the new controller’s part cannot readily 
be inferred, not to mention the separate issue as to whether 
that person has the requisite entrepreneurial acumen to take the 
business forward successfully.266 It is in these latter circum-
stances that there is a risk of the so-called “idiot heir”267 problem 
arising.
 The “idiot heir” phenomenon denotes situations where the 
offspring, spouse or other familial successor of a corporate 
262 See id. at 620–21.  
263 See id.
264 See id. at 609, 620. 
265 See id.
266 See id. at 605 
267 This term is attributable to Bebchuk & Kastiel, id.
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founder acquires control over the firm via inheritance, but without 
possessing the same degree of entrepreneurial acumen, integrity 
and/or motivation as their predecessor.268 In a non-DCS company 
with a uniform share voting structure, there is at least the back-
ground assurance that where the relevant firm’s value is conse-
quently reduced to a sufficiently material level,269 the new con-
troller(s) will become vulnerable to potential ouster by means of an 
outside contest for control. However, where the relevant company 
has a DCS structure in favor of the new controller(s), that person (or 
group) has an effective power of veto over any attempted control 
acquisition, thereby locking down the firm under their command 
at the potential expense of its independent investors. Moreover, 
where the DCS structure persists beyond the lifespan of the succes-
sor-controller herself, the “idiot heir” problem could potentially 
even carry down through further familial generations, at least in-
sofar as the firm stays out of bankruptcy.270
 In acknowledgment of these potential collateral effects of 
allowing DCS structures, the reformed (as of 2018) Singaporean 
Listing Rules provide that multiple-vote shares (MVSs)—while now 
generally permitted for SGX-listed companies—will automatically 
convert into standard (single-vote) equity shares on either: (i) the 
MVS holder ceasing to be a director whether as a result of death, 
retirement or otherwise, or (ii) the original MVS holder transferring 
268 Id. In this regard, Reddy reports how “numerous studies have shown that 
controlling shareholder firms perform worse where control is in the hands of heirs 
as opposed to the original founder.” See Reddy, supra note 60, at 37. 
269 Indeed, in this regard, Bebchuk and Kastiel note the existence of “evidence 
that companies run by descendants often underperform other family companies 
that are managed by their founders or by hired external managers.” Bebchuk & 
Kastiel, supra note 12, at 606. 
270 As SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson vividly puts it: 
[P]erpetual dual-class ownership—forever shares—don’t just 
ask investors to trust a visionary founder. It asks them to trust 
that founder’s kids. And their kids’ kids. And their grandkid’s
kids. (Some of whom may, or may not, be visionaries.) It raises the 
prospect that control over our public companies, and ultimately 
of Main Street’s retirement savings, will be forever held by a small, 
elite group of corporate insiders—who will pass that power down 
to their heirs. 
Jackson, supra note 1 (emphasis in original). 
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her shares to a new holder.271 The only exception to this rule applies 
where the relevant company shareholders have affirmatively pro-
vided—by majority vote—for the continuation of the MVSs in any 
of the above instances.272 However, to be effective the above disap-
plication vote must be carried out by way of an “enhanced voting 
process” whereby all shares voted (whether single- or multiple-vote) 
are recorded strictly on a one share/one vote basis for the purpose 
of the resolution in question.273
 The new (post-2017) Hong Kong listings regime likewise 
requires the automatic conversion of MVSs into single-vote equity 
shares on an MVS holder’s death, incapacity, retirement or removal 
as a director of a DCS company, or on the transfer of the MVSs 
(or, at least, the economic interest therein) to another person.274
In the U.S. listings environment, meanwhile, it is noteworthy that 
Alphabet/Google’s “Class B” (in order words, multi-vote) stock is sub-
ject to a firm-specific sunset provision of a fundamentally equivalent 
character to the above provisions.275 And, in a similar vein, Lyft’s 
2019 dual-class IPO on NASDAQ involved a transfer-centered sun-
set provision with a specific succession-based trigger, which was 
preferred over both a more general transfer-based trigger and a 
time-based sunset.276
271 SGX Mainboard Rules, supra note 28.  
272 Id. at (10)(f)(ii).
273 Id. at (10)(f). In addition, under new SGX Listing Rule 210(10)(d), all 
MVSs in SGX-listed firms have their voting entitlement mandatorily capped 
at ten votes per share at all times, irrespective of any contractual or constitutional 
provision to the contrary. Id. at (10)(d).  
274 HK LISTING RULES, RULE 8A.17–8A.22, https://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media 
/HKEX-Market/Listing/Rules-and-Guidance/Listing-Rules-Contingency/Main 
-Board-Listing-Rules/Equity-Securities/chapter_8a.pdf?la=en [https://perma 
.cc/KWP3-9VZD]. See also HKEX, supra note 36, Appendix I, at I-6-7. In a similar 
vein, the current (post-2008) Japanese listings regime requires the automatic 
conversion of MVSs into single-vote shares on either the death of the original 
MVS holder or the transfer of her shares to a third party. See Toshima, supra 
note 71, at 44. 
275 See Alphabet, Inc., supra note 35. 
276 Sharfman, Sunsets, supra note 97, at 7. On this, see also Bebchuk & 
Kastiel, Lyft, supra note 60. 
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III. THE CASE IN FAVOR OF THE TRANSFER-CENTERED MODEL
 From the preceding discussion, it should be apparent that 
the issue of DCS sunset design is by no means a “one-size-fits-
all”277 endeavor. On the contrary, there are in practice a variety 
of general sunset models for investors, managers and (where 
relevant) regulators which to choose.278 Furthermore, on a lower 
level of granularity there are also a wide range of specific po-
tential triggers within each of those models.279 As mentioned 
above, the time-centered model is unquestionably the most popu-
lar one today (at least in the United States), not least on account 
of the strong support that this model has garnered from influen-
tial investor-related bodies.280
 The intuitive appeal of the time-centered model over the 
principal alternative sunset paradigms is entirely understand-
able. As well as being relatively simple for corporate lawyers 
to design, it is also comparatively costless for investors, proxy 
advisors and regulators to implement and enforce, due to the 
uniform and straightforward nature of the standard time 
thresholds.281 However, as will be argued below, from a broader 
social point of view the time-based model is—in certain respects—
the most problematic of the principal sunset models available, 
whereas the transfer-centered model is the least problematic of 
the three.282 This is for three main reasons, which shall be ex-
plained in turn below.283 These are: (i) the lesser degree of arbi-
trariness of the transfer-centered sunset model compared to the 
time- and ownership-based models; (ii) the lesser danger of the 
transfer-centered model giving rise to moral hazard and other per-
verse controller incentives, relative to the time-centered model at 
least; and (iii) the unique sensitivity of the transfer-centered 
277 The author’s usage of this term in the present context is attributable to 
David Berger. See Berger, supra note 103, at 15. 
278 See supra Part II; see also Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1086–91 
(discussing alternative sunset provisions).  
279 See id. at 1086 (describing several events that may trigger a sunset). 
280 See supra Section II.A.  
281 See Delaware Letter, supra note 195, at 7 n.16.   
282 See infra Section III.A. 
283 See infra Sections III.A–C.
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model to the powerful non-financial motivations of multiple-vote-
holding corporate founders.284
 The third of the above considerations in particular suggests 
that dogmatic adherence by academic commentators to the agency 
cost rationale for time- and ownership-based sunsets is not only 
unnecessary, but also potentially harmful to the long-term busi-
ness performance of DCS companies.285 At the same time, this 
Article will caution against necessarily embracing a “pure” pri-
vate ordering approach to DCS sunset design, which some other 
commentators have called for.286
A. Lesser Degree of Arbitrariness 
 It is submitted that the first key comparative advantage of 
the transfer-centered model of sunset design is its lesser degree 
of arbitrariness in comparison with the other two main models, 
and especially the time-centered one.287 Indeed, it is in this regard 
that the time-centered model’s key practical strength—namely its 
relative simplicity and uniformity—also becomes its main weakness 
by imposing a “bright-line” objective approach to what is, more often 
than not, a matter of nuanced and subjective business judgment.288
 The conversion of a DCS structure to a universal single-
vote arrangement can have potentially profound implications, not 
just for those investors who are immediately affected but also for 
the relevant firm as a whole.289 In addition to effecting an auto-
matic de facto wealth transfer from the controller(s) to minority 
shareholders, it also has the collateral impact of intensifying the 
outside capital market pressures acting on the controller(s) and her 
managerial delegates, who are suddenly subjected to the poten-
tially destabilizing pressures of the market for corporate control.290
284 Id.
285 See infra Section III.C. 
286 See infra Section III.C. 
287 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1081–82; see also Sharfman, Sunsets,
supra note 97, at 10. 
288 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1062–63, 1080–82.  
289 See Sharfman, Sunsets, supra note 97, at 9–10. 
290 On the purportedly destabilizing effect of such pressures generally, see 
STOUT, supra note 117, ch. 6; MAYER, supra note 119, at 89–116; Andrei Shleifer 
2020] DESIGNING DUAL-CLASS SUNSETS 147 
In a company whose controller—behind the notional capital market 
buffer of a DCS structure—had previously been pursuing a strategic 
course of action that was idiosyncratic291 and/or successful in an 
oblique292 or inchoate way, the sudden imperative to communicate 
that business model to an external capital market constituency 
can be a galling task.293
 The ensuing corporate culture shock may even necessitate 
a consequent shift in the fundamental purpose of the business294
towards a more overtly shareholder value-oriented objective.295 Of 
course, in some instances, exposing an incumbent management and 
corporate culture to such external pressures can be a beneficial 
way of reinvigorating an ailing or stagnant business, especially 
where a founder’s vision and ideas have become outmoded as a 
result of market, technological or other societal shifts.296 How-
ever, where a DCS sunset provision is activated prematurely, 
such exposure can potentially be harmful for the firm (and, indirectly, 
its general body of shareholders) by facilitating unwarranted in-
terference by activist and institutional investors in a controller’s 
implementation of her long-term strategic plan or vision.297
& Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers in CORPORATE 
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33–67 (Alan J. Auerbach ed. 1988); 
Simon Deakin & Giles Slinger, Hostile Takeovers, Corporate Law and the Theory 
of the Firm, 24 J.L. & SOC’Y 124 (1997). 
291 On the potential economic value to the firm and its investors of idiosyn-
cratic entrepreneurial vision, see generally Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 132. 
292 On the potential economic value to the firm and its investors of oblique 
or indirect (as opposed to instrumental or direct) methods of corporate profit-
making, see generally JOHN KAY, OBLIQUITY: WHY OUR GOALS ARE BEST 
ACHIEVED INDIRECTLY 24–34 (2011). 
293 On the communicative imperatives of capital markets vis-à-vis corporate 
managers generally, see Moore & Walker-Arnott, supra note 13, at 432–37; FROUD 
ET AL., supra note 133, ch. 5. 
294 On the notion of corporate purpose generally as viewed from a legal per-
spective, see Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in the ‘Anglo-American’ 
Corporation, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 579, pt. II (2010); BARNALI CHOUDHURY & MARTIN 
PETRIN, CORPORATE DUTIES TO THE PUBLIC ch. 3 (2019). 
295 Berger, supra note 103. 
296 On the propensity of corporate-managerial “insiders” to overvalue the 
firm’s internal capital allocation plans, and the corresponding value of external 
stock market signals as a potential means of correcting such overvaluations, 
see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1469–70 (2007). 
297 On this, see supra notes 103–09 and accompanying text. 
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 The contention here is not that DCS sunsets, or indeed 
DCS structures generally, are inherently “good” or “bad” in terms 
of their overall economic efficiency or social utility. The point, 
rather, is that there is no “one-size-fits-all” optimal time period 
for DCS sunsets.298 On the contrary, determining an appropriate 
sunset period for any DCS company is an inherently contextual 
and firm-specific issue that eludes universal regulatory treat-
ment.299 Accordingly, any micro-level equilibrium in this regard 
is dependent on the nature of the relevant corporate controller(s), 
business model, organizational culture, product market, tech-
nological environment, and/or point in the relevant business life 
cycle.300 Indeed, typical corporate investment time horizons can 
vary considerably both between and even within industrial 
sectors, ranging from as short as three to five years in some sec-
tors to as high as ten to fifteen in others.301 In respect of certain 
radically innovative and technologically intensive initiatives, the 
investment-to-return time frame can potentially even be much 
higher.302
 In view of the above, it becomes apparent that regulatory 
requirements for fixed-term sunsets calibrated on anything wider 
than a firm-specific basis are inherently arbitrary in nature.303
The CII’s abovementioned proposal for universal seven-year 
sunsets is especially problematic in terms of arbitrariness given 
its intended potential application to the U.S.-listed company 
sector in its entirety.304 As Goshen points out, such a bright-line 
298 Sharfman, Sunsets, supra note 97, at 10. 
299 Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1063. 
300 Govindarajan et al. claim that “a sunset clause would be ideal if there 
exists a fixed, predetermined time after which all companies become mature 
enough to need no further changes in their business models.” Govindarajan et 
al., supra note 18. However, they point out that a company’s age-to-maturity 
period typically “differs based on the firm’s technology and business model” 
such that “a one-size-fits-all policy would not work.” See id.
301 HM TREASURY, FINANCING GROWTH IN INNOVATIVE FIRMS: CONSULTA-




303 See Goshen, supra note 151.
304 See supra note 195 and accompanying text.  
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rule seems predicated on the unrealistic notion that entrepre-
neurial vision can only be realized successfully during the first 
seven years of a company’s post-IPO life, whereas in fact “there is 
nothing in the company, or in life, suggesting that” to be the 
case.305
 Moreover, even firm-specific sunsets are not necessarily 
immune from charges of arbitrariness in that, by their very 
nature, they are designed proactively a number of years ahead of 
their intended activation.306 As such, their formulation inevitably 
takes place to some extent in the abstract, without knowledge or 
foresight of the specific challenges facing the relevant firm’s 
business at the (later) point in its life cycle when the relevant 
sunset is activated.307 In this regard, Fisch and Solomon note that 
in most current instances of time-based sunsets “the length of 
the sunset period appears to be arbitrary and does not seem to 
correlate with any theory about the length of time necessary for a 
founder to implement his or her vision.”308 However, as the same 
authors highlight, “[t]he timeframe necessary for realizing a 
company’s goals is likely to vary depending on the company, based 
on factors like the company’s maturity at the IPO stage, the 
duration of its business model, and the time required to develop its 
products or services and bring them to market.”309 Accordingly, 
any sunset provision that is triggered by an ex ante time-con-
tingent trigger—whether regulatory or firm-specific in nature—
inevitably runs the risk of cutting adversely against the grain of 
the relevant firm’s business trajectory at the time of its eventual 
activation.310
 Given their more contingent and context-dependent nature, 
ownership-based and other event-triggered sunsets are, in general, 
less problematic than time-based sunsets in terms of their po-
tential arbitrariness.311 However, even ownership-based trig-
gers are susceptible to the same charge of eliciting crude and 
305 Goshen, supra note 151. 
306 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1080–81. 
307 See id. at 1081.
308 Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1081. 
309 Id. at 1082.
310 See id. at 1084. 
311 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1086. 
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factually insensitive outcomes.312 This risk is especially pertinent 
where a corporate founder or other controlling shareholder may 
have legitimate prudential motivations for wishing to liquidate 
part of her multi-vote holding, for example to obtain enhanced 
personal liquidity.313 In those instances, it is likely that the multi-
vote holder will significantly reduce her proportionate cash flow 
interest in the firm, irrespective of her continuing faith in and/or 
commitment to the firm’s success.314 As such, the increased wedge 
consequently arising between her voting and corresponding cash 
flow rights in the firm should not be presumed to denote a case of 
the proverbial captain fleeing her sinking ship, as an agency-cost-
centered interpretation of the same scenario would typically 
suggest.315 For this reason, an ownership-based sunset trigger 
can prove a potential curb on an incumbent multi-vote holder’s 
personal financial flexibility, which can in turn increase the rele-
vant firm’s cost of raising fresh equity capital from prospective 
future controllers.316
 Compared to the time and ownership-centered sunset 
models, the transfer-centered model is less susceptible to allega-
tions of harmful arbitrariness.317 This is for two main reasons. 
First, since a transfer-based sunset will only be triggered by the 
death or retirement (as a director) of the multi-vote holder(s), or 
the sale of her equity stake, there is consequently no risk of a 
transfer-based trigger being activated during the period of an in-
cumbent controller’s premiership.318 This insures against the risk 
of disturbance to the firm’s pre-existing business trajectory.319
And, second, since a transfer of corporate control (whether by way 
of succession or sale/purchase) inevitably entails a sudden change 
of trajectory for the firm’s business (whether strategically or at 
312 See id.
313 See Marc Moore, Designing Dual Class Sunsets: The Case for a Transfer-




315 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1086. 
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least culturally), in any event, it follows that conversion of the 
firm’s capital structure at this point in time will not in itself be a 
likely cause of organizational destabilization.320
 Accordingly, the transfer-centered model would appear the 
preferable option from the above perspective.321
B. Avoidance of Moral Hazard and Other Perverse Controller  
Incentives
 In addition to their alleged arbitrariness, time-based sunsets 
are also susceptible to criticism on account of their purportedly 
perverse behavioral effects.322 This is because a time-based sunset—
whether prompted by regulation or private ordering—arguably 
creates an artificial incentive on the part of an incumbent controller 
to dispose of her DCS holding at some point within the specified 
pre-sunset period.323 By doing so, the controller will expectedly be 
able to recoup as much of her remaining control premium as pos-
sible before it dissipates on the triggering of the applicable sunset 
deadline.324 As Coffee has noted, this could have the unintended 
consequence of engendering greater industry concentration by en-
couraging dynamic start-up founders to sell their multi-vote stakes 
to established market leaders some time before the expiry of their 
privileged governance status.325 In turn, the above trend could have 
the long-term effect of creating what Coffee has termed a “permanent 
gerontocracy”,326 which presumably denotes a heavily concentrated 
320 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1088. 
321 See generally id. at 1088–89. 
322 See id. at 1083.
323 See id. at 1083. 
324 See id. Although, as Fisch and Solomon have highlighted, in principle such 
differential pricing of multi-vote vis-a-vis single-vote stakes could be eliminated 
by inserting an equal treatment provision in the relevant company’s charter, 
which would in effect compel the controller to sell her (controlling) multi-vote stake 
at the same per-share price as any (non-controlling) single-vote stake(s). Id. at 
1089. However, whether the relevant multi-vote holder would be prepared to as-
sent to such a wealth-reducing condition in practice is questionable, at least 
without demanding some corresponding compensation in the form of a higher 
upfront cost of capital and/or offsetting side benefits (e.g., an increased execu-
tive salary). See Kirby Smith, The Agency Costs of Equal Treatment Clauses,
127 YALE L.J. FORUM 543, 561 (2017). 
325 Coffee, supra note 6, at 2. 
326 Id.
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corporate sector dominated by a small group of large, mature, and 
clunky market leaders.327
 Of course, insofar as conversion of the multi-vote shares to 
common (single vote) stock takes place automatically on the 
triggering of the relevant sunset provision, it follows that ac-
quisition of the (controlling) multi-vote stake will not in itself 
guarantee the acquirer long-term corporate control.328 Accord-
ingly, the extent of the price differential attaching to the multi-vote 
dimension of a DCS structure will tend to reduce progressively 
towards zero as the pre-specified sunset date nears.329 However, 
even then, there is still a significant moral hazard risk with a 
time-based sunset, which can consequently compel the multi-vote 
holder in this position—faced with the known prospect of immi-
nent loss of control—to engage in short-term, excessively risky 
and/or self-serving behavior in order to maximize her own per-
sonal wealth prior to the inevitable “cliff edge”330 of the predeter-
mined sunset deadline arriving.331
 In response to the above criticism of time-based sunsets, 
Bebchuk and Kastiel point out that, with a provision in the form 
recently proposed by the CII, the termination of the relevant 
DCS structure after the specified time period is not a necessary 
consequence.332 Rather, as explained above, under the CII-backed 
model, minority (single-vote) shareholders can always opt to 
327  Although Coffee himself does not offer an explicit definition of this term 
in the present context, the Oxford/Lexio dictionary defines the word “gerontocracy” 
in its more generic (i.e., non-corporate-specific) sense as denoting “a state, society 
or group governed by old people”. Gerontocracy, LEXIO, https://www.lexico.com 
/en/definition/gerontocracy [https://perma.cc/E57V-PMUD].
328 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 611. 
329 See id.
330 Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1083. 
331 Id. Admittedly, it could be queried why the other two dominant types of 
sunset provisions examined in this article are not prone to have the same per-
verse incentive effects on corporate controllers. See generally id. at 1086–91. 
However, it is submitted that in the case of ownership, transfer, and other 
event-based sunsets, the elements of contingency and resulting indeterminacy 
involved in triggering the relevant DCS conversion provision mean that such 
sunsets typically do not have the same cliff-edged nature as ex ante time-based 
sunsets. See id. at 1083, 1086. It is therefore arguable that the risk of incumbent 
controllers engaging in “last shot” reckless or rent-seeking behavior is, in gen-
eral, a less exigent corporate governance concern in those latter instances. 
332 See NASDAQ Letter, supra note 195. 
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retain the DCS structure after the initial (e.g., seven-year) sunset 
period by means of an affirmative independent vote to this effect.333
This theoretically caters to instances where a DCS structure con-
tinues to prove advantageous for the firm and its investors, by 
enabling voluntary deactivation (or, at least, suspension) of the 
sunset trigger by minority shareholders.334 However, the argu-
ment that the cliff-edged nature of time-based sunsets—together 
with their consequent adverse behavioral influence on controllers—
are effectively neutralized by the procedural stopgap of an inde-
pendent shareholder vote on the matter is a highly problematic 
one.335 This is for two main reasons. 
 First, it fails to account for the significance of the time-based 
sunset’s default status under the CII’s model and, relatedly, the 
fact that any independent shareholder vote on postponement of 
the sunset’s triggering must be proposed by way of a proactive 
minority shareholder resolution to this effect.336 If that significant 
hurdle is passed, there remains the additional challenge of securing 
a majority independent shareholder vote to this effect, which, in 
the public company environment, can be a galling corporate gov-
ernance task for even the most active and committed of inves-
tors.337 Against the background of these significant communication 
333 Id.
334 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 624. 
335 See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 
AEA PAPERS & PROC. 175, 176 (2003). 
336 In this regard, Thaler and Sunstein have highlighted how selecting a 
“default option” is in practice never a value-neutral decision for policymakers, 
but in reality has an inevitable paternalistic or welfarist element to it. Id. The
authors explain that “[i]n a fully rational world such design choices would have 
little effect (at least in high-stakes situations) because agents would simply 
choose the best option for them regardless of the default.” Id. However, as against 
this, they observe how “numerous experiments illustrate that there is a very strong 
‘status quo’ bias [in practice]” whereby “[t]he existing arrangement, whether set 
out by private institutions or by government, tends to stick.” Id. For an ex-
tended and more generic (i.e., non-corporate-specific) argument to this effect by 
the same authors, see generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
337 This factor is especially concerning given Berger’s recent observation 
that “the most striking empirical studies these days are those showing that the 
traditional measures of ‘good corporate governance’ have little relationship to 
either corporate performance or ethical corporate behavior.” Berger, supra note 
103, at 15. Rather, “all that is measured by corporate governance studies is 
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and coordination difficulties, it becomes clear that the default status 
of an automatic time-based sunset is far from a trivial matter.338
On the contrary, it matters a great deal in weighing the conversion 
versus postponement question firmly in favor of the former out-
come, which is therefore likely to ensue in all but the most mani-
festly inappropriate cases.339 Even in those instances, though, it is 
debatable whether the arguments in favor of postponement will 
be sufficiently compelling in the eyes of non-controlling investors 
to bring about the circumvention of a time-based sunset’s auto-
matic activation.340
whether a company meets the current ‘checklist’ of various governance metrics, 
which again have little to do with performance or ethics.” Id. On the common 
investor and intermediary practice of corporate governance “box-checking” 
generally (albeit with principal reference to the United Kingdom, rather than 
the United States, securities market context), see generally Moore, supra note 
179, at 117–25; supra note 212 and accompanying text; Bobby V. Reddy, Think-
ing Outside the Box—Eliminating the Perniciousness of Box-Ticking in the New 
Corporate Governance Code, 82 MOD. L. REV. 692 (2019). 
338 On status quo bias generally, see generally William Samuelson & Richard 
Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J.RISK UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988). 
339 On one view, setting a one share/one vote default norm for former DCS 
companies after seven years could be regarded as an example of what Ayres and 
Gertner have termed a “penalty default” rule, which is deliberately set in favor 
of the less informed party (i.e., non-controlling shareholders) so as to give the 
more informed party (i.e., the founder and/or controlling shareholder) the in-
centive to reveal greater information to the other party (e.g., as to their future 
strategic plans for the company) as a precondition of securing their support for 
reversing the relevant default (i.e., for reintroducing a DCS structure). Ian Ayres 
& Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97–100 (1989). However, it is questionable to what 
extent non-controlling shareholders can actually be regarded as relatively less 
well-informed on corporate governance issues within the contemporary U.S. 
capital market environment, where institutional investors, proxy advisors and 
other specialized professional intermediaries now customarily exert a perva-
sive influence over key corporate governance norm selections and adaptations 
at the individual firm level. Christie Hayne & Marshall D. Vance, Information 
Intermediary or De Facto Standard Setter?: Field Evidence on the Indirect and 
Direct Influence of Proxy Advisors, HARV.L.SCH.F. ON CORP.GOVERNANCE (Mar. 20, 
2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/03/20/information-intermediary-or-de 
facto-standard-setter-field-evidence-on-the-indirect-and-direct-influence-of-proxy 
-advisors/ [https://perma.cc/U45R-78RF].  
340 In view of the above factors, it would arguably be more appropriate for 
securities market regulators to set the retention of the DCS structure after the 
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 A second reason for doubting the effectiveness of independent 
shareholder sunset postponement votes is the inherent conflict of 
interest that non-controlling, single-vote shareholders will be 
faced with in this scenario.341 When voting on the sensitive con-
version versus postponement question with respect to a given 
company’s DCS structure, single-vote shareholders will be acting 
in the knowledge that they stand to gain directly from the removal of 
the multi-vote holder’s control premium via DCS conversion.342
Vice versa, on conversion of the DCS structure to a uniform one 
share/one vote platform, the single-vote shareholders’ correspond-
ing minority discount will automatically be offset.343 The prospect 
of reaping this immediate personal wealth gain will make it highly 
difficult, if not outright impossible, for the single-vote sharehold-
ers to give genuinely impartial consideration to the question of 
which voting arrangement is in the long-term interest of the com-
pany and its investor body as a whole.344 The existence of this 
manifest conflict on the part of single-vote shareholders arguably 
further strengthens the case for weighing the conversion versus 
postponement decision on the side of the latter outcome, by setting 
the retention of the existing DCS structure as the reversible-default 
initial sunset period (e.g., seven years) as the default norm, while vesting in-
dependent (single-vote) shareholders with the right to propose and vote on con-
verting the super-voting shares to single-vote shares. See generally Ayres & 
Gertner, supra note 339; Hayne & Vance, supra note 339. By inverting the 
abovementioned CII-backed reform in this way, regulators may well strike a 
more efficient balance between encouraging the take-up of time-based sunsets 
by listed DCS companies and preventing independent shareholders from being 
swayed by status quo bias into systematically favoring DCS conversion on the 
expiration of the initial sunset period. See generally Govindarajan et al., supra
note 18. At the same time, activist and institutional investors will still have the 
right to propose conversion resolutions in appropriate instances, especially where 
those proposals attract additional support from proxy advisors and other influ-
ential pro minority-shareholder groups. See NASDAQ Letter, supra note 195. 
On the relevant CII proposal in its existing form, and related discussion, see 
generally Council of Institutional Invs., supra notes 193–95. 
341 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1084. 
342 Id.
343 See William J. Piercy, For What It’s Worth ... Court Rejects Minority Dis-
count in Valuing Stock, BERMAN FINK VAN HORN P.C. BLOGS (May 21, 2018), 
https://www.bfvlaw.com/for-what-its-worth-court-rejects-minority-discount-in 
-valuing-stock/ [https://perma.cc/9TTS-DC75].
344 Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1084–85. 
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outcome of time-based sunsets (to the extent, of course, that it is seen 
as prudent to mandate or even deploy such provisions for DCS 
companies generally).345
 For the above reasons, it is therefore unlikely that the avail-
ability of an independent shareholder postponement vote will be 
effective in mitigating the moral hazard and other unintended be-
havioral consequences that time-based (and, to a lesser extent, 
ownership-based) sunsets are liable to give rise to.346 It conse-
quently pays to consider other less obtuse or intrusive ways of 
designing sunset triggers, especially if any such provision is in-
tended as a blueprint for prospective future regulatory reforms. 
C. Sensitivity to Non-Financial Controller Motivations 
At the heart of the academic case for time-based (and, by impli-
cation, ownership-based) sunsets is the abovementioned “wedge”347
issue: that is to say, the disparity that can develop between a multi-
vote holder’s governance and cash flow rights in a DCS company, and 
the ensuing agency problems that this mismatch is said to create.348
Accordingly, purely transfer-based sunsets that are triggered 
only by the death or retirement of corporate founders are said to 
be insufficiently responsive to developing agency cost issues in 
founder-controlled DCS firms.349
 For example, Bebchuk and Kastiel question the effective-
ness of succession-triggered sunsets that permit DCS structures 
to endure throughout a multi-vote holder’s life (or, at least, for the 
length of her ownership or directorial tenure).350 This is on the 
345 In this regard, Sharfman explains that since, 
[s]hareholders suffer from the problems of asymmetric information 
and the simple inability to make the proper evaluation of a leader’s 
idiosyncratic vision [they are consequently left] in the position 
of having the knowledge that ending the dual class share struc-
ture will expose the shares to the market for corporate control 
and hedge fund activism, an expected positive for the com-
pany’s share price, without being able to evaluate the cost. 
Sharfman, Sunsets, supra note 97, at 9–10. 
346 Id.
347 Id. at 7. 
348 See id. at 9–10. 
349 See Winden, supra note 196, at 894. 
350 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 619. 
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purported premise that “[a] founder who has decades of working 
life ahead of her poses substantial risks that she would not remain 
a fitting leader of the company throughout her entire working life.”351
The authors consequently conclude that such arrangements are 
“substantially inferior” from an agency cost perspective than 
shorter-term time-based sunset provisions.352
 In a similar vein, Goshen and Hamdani claim that, because 
multi-vote holders—as effective minority controllers—have a 
lesser proportion of residual cash flow rights at risk than control-
ling majority shareholders in single-class stock companies, it follows 
that independent investors are likely to face greater exposure to 
controller agency costs in firms with DCS structures.353 They ar-
gue that, in contrast, “the concentrated-ownership structure al-
lows [a controlling majority shareholder] to enjoy indefinite and 
uncontestable control without subjecting investors to the high 
management agency costs associated with the dual-class struc-
ture.”354 In forming such a favorable impression of orthodox ma-
jority control structures over their minority control (e.g., DCS) 
counterparts, Goshen and Hamdani proceed on the express as-
sumption that “[t]he higher the controller’s share of cash-flow 
rights, the lower her incentive to expropriate the minority.”355 In 
this regard, they refer to the perceived “lock-in” effect of orthodox 
controlling shareholdings, which are typically illiquid in nature 
due to their relatively large scale, coupled with the significant 
concentration of firm-specific risk that they tend to entail.356 As 
such, majority control stakes in large business organizations are 
normally unsusceptible to ready disposal, and consequently do not 
permit their holder a frictionless exit from her position at any de-
sired moment in time.357 A notable implication of Goshen and 
Hamdani’s analysis is that DCS and other minority control struc-
tures—correspondingly—do not have such a lock-in effect on a 
351 Id. at 620.
352 Id.
353 Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 132, at 590–91. 
354 Id. at 593. 
355 Id. at 591. 
356 Id. at 593. 
357 Id.
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multi-vote-holder’s position in the firm.358 As such, they purport-
edly fail to restrict a multi-vote-holder’s capacity “to quickly walk 
away from the business,”359 thereby undermining the propensity of 
entrepreneurial controllers to commit to ensuring DCS compa-
nies’ long-term development and success (in preference to expro-
priating private benefits of control).360
 However, while controller alienation and/or rent extraction 
in DCS companies might seem likely when viewed from a purely 
agency cost-oriented perspective, on a broader and more nuanced 
analysis such concerns would appear to be significantly over-
stated.361 It is submitted that the principal blind spot of orthodox 
agency cost analyses of DCS structures is their tendency to over-
look the overall calculus of financial and non-financial costs of 
private (and especially founder) control, by regarding only the for-
mer type of cost as an effective constraint on entrepreneurial wealth 
extraction.362 Thus the presumptive starting point of the agency cost 
view is that without some meaningful element of “skin in the 
game” in the form of personal financial risk exposure, controllers 
of DCS companies stand to lose relatively little from abandon-
ment and/or misuse of their privileged governance position within 
the firm.363
 What the above problematization of DCS fails to recog-
nize, though, is the practical reality that multi-vote-holding 
controllers—and especially founder-entrepreneurs—have consid-
erably more at stake in the firm than just their basic financial 
equity.364 Of comparable personal significance for an entrepre-
neur are the crucial non-financial personal consequences of the 
failure or underperformance of a business enterprise that she 
358 See id.
359 Id.
360 See id. at 593–94. 
361 See Lemley & McCreary, supra note 137, at 23. 
362 In this regard, it has recently been highlighted that since “firms that go 
public are commonly controlled by founders, and going public in any case rewards 
founders who care about non-pecuniary factors (control, public prominence, etc.) 
rather than profit maximization,” it follows that “[w]ithout such founder con-
trol and non-financial motivations, the go-public rate might be lower still.” Id.
363 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 620. 
364 Melissa S. Cardon et al., The Nature and Experience of Entrepreneurial 
Passion, 34 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 511, 512–14, 517, 521 (2009). 
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has founded and invested her time, energy, and creativity in, in-
cluding the loss of valuable reputational capital amongst peers 
and associates.365
 It has been observed how reputational constraints on 
minority controller rent-seeking can be especially compelling in 
family controlled firms,366 given the status of families as effective 
“repositories for reputation.”367 In addition, there is the common 
personal interest of founder-entrepreneurs in maintaining firm 
growth for the benefit of subsequent familial generations, which 
provides a further powerful motivation to limit their exploitation 
of private benefits of control on an ongoing basis.368 Reputational 
incentives for responsible (or, at the very least, non-exploitative) 
controller conduct in DCS companies are arguably further in-
tensified in instances where a minority controller envisages 
issuing additional nonvoting or restricted voting stock in the 
future, which creates an imperative to keep the external capital 
market onside.369 The above considerations together support a 
general presumption that family controlled firms—or, at least those 
family firms at the first generation (founder) stage—will be 
managed in a broadly diligent and responsible manner without
the systematic exploitation of private benefits of control, not-
withstanding the existence of a significant wedge between the 
founder-entrepreneur’s voting and corresponding cash flow rights 
in the firm. Or, at the very least, they imply that adoption of such 
a default starting point is not as naïve or misguided a position 
as agency cost analyses of minority control structures would tend 
to suggest. 
 With respect to entrepreneurial motivation more generally,370
meanwhile, psychological research has highlighted the centricity 
to entrepreneurship (based on an analogy with parenthood) of 
entrepreneurial passion, and a founder-entrepreneur’s typi-
cally strong sense of attachment to and identification with their 
365 Id. at 513, 521, 527. 
366 See BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 56, at 305–06. 
367 Id. at 306. See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership 
Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999). 
368 See BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 56, at 306. 
369 See Sheehan, supra note 148, at 318. 
370 That is to say, both within and outside the family firm context. 
160 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:093 
personal business venture.371 Entrepreneurial passion is said 
to be experienced “as a complex pattern of psychological, brain 
and body responses activated and maintained by an entrepre-
neur’s passion that, when [self-]regulated, aid in motivating 
coherent and coordinated goal pursuit.”372 Crucial to entrepre-
neurial passion in the above sense is the notion of self-identity, 
which is claimed to provoke “intense positive feelings experienced 
by engagement in entrepreneurial activities associated with 
roles that are meaningful and salient to the self-identity of the 
entrepreneur.”373
 The notion of entrepreneurial passion has recently been 
developed further by Lahti et al., who claim that “a venture 
embodies the founding entrepreneur’s creations, ideas, goals, 
unique knowledge, work, invested efforts, and life experiences, 
all of which are expressive of and salient to the entrepreneur’s 
representation of the self,” thereby engendering “a high degree of 
motivation to act on behalf of the venture.”374 It follows from this 
purported “sense of self”375 embodied in the entrepreneurial firm 
that “the venture’s failure may severely reduce the entrepreneur’s 
self-worth, causing the entrepreneur to suffer shame and em-
barrassment.”376 Vice versa, it has been observed how entrepre-
neurial passion brings powerful “nonmonetary [and especially 
371 Melissa S. Cardon et al., A Tale of Passion: New Insights into Entrepre-
neurship From a Parenthood Metaphor, 20 J. BUS. VENTURING 23, 23–27 (2005) 
[hereinafter A Tale of Passion]. Building (inter alia) on these insights, more 
recent psychological research conducted by Lahti et al. has identified a compa-
rable phenomenon which these authors term “entrepreneurial bonding”, denoting 
“an entrepreneur’s profound connection with the venture” in a fundamentally 
similar vein to parent-to-child bonding. Tom Lahti et al., Why and How do 
Founding Entrepreneurs Bond with their Ventures? Neural Correlates of En-
trepreneurial and Parental Bonding, 34 J. BUS. VENTURING 368, 368–69 (2019). 
Lahti et al. claim that, “[b]y developing strong bonds with their ventures, founding 
entrepreneurs become motivated to overcome environmental threats and chal-
lenges, putting themselves in a better position to improve venture creation out-
comes, growth, and performance.” Id. at 369. 
372 See Cardon et al., supra note 364, at 518. 
373 Id. at 517. 
374 See Lahti et al., supra note 371, at 371. 
375 Id.
376 Id. at 372. 
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emotional377] rewards” to offset lower monetary rewards from 
self-conducted business, while also encouraging self-sacrifice and 
delayed gratification on the entrepreneur’s part.378 At the same 
time, an entrepreneur’s identification with, or attachment to, 
their firm or venture can cause them to view that firm in effect as 
an extension of themselves, especially in instances where the firm 
(rather like a human offspring) inherits some of the founder’s per-
sonal character traits as reflected in its distinct organizational cul-
ture and norms.379
 From the perspective of the issue at hand, one notable pur-
ported implication of such attachment is that engagement in en-
trepreneurial activities that are meaningful to self-identity is 
principally simulated not “by the instrumental goal of wealth cre-
ation and ‘maximisation,’” but rather by “intrinsic motivation 
stemming from the validation and affirmation of an entrepre-
neur’s conception of true self.”380 Curiously, it has been found that 
in such circumstances “wealth seeking is relevant but not central 
to the conception of the self.”381 Moreover, entrepreneurial pas-
sion, insofar as it is linked inextricably to self-identity, is said by 
its nature to “endure over a longer period of time” as opposed to 
being merely fleeting or episodic in nature.382 As such, it purport-
edly “has a motivational effect that stimulates entrepreneurs to 
overcome obstacles and remain engaged.”383
 However, whereas intrinsic motivations of the above type 
are typically present on the part of first-generation (founder) 
controllers, they tend not to be so prevalent within second-gen-
eration family firms controlled by a founder-entrepreneur’s de-
scendant(s).384 The same can arguably be said for entrepreneurial 
abilities, which are by no means certain to transmit through 
377 See A Tale of Passion, supra note 371, at 37. 
378 Id.
379 Id. at 38–39. 
380 See Cardon et al., supra note 364, at 526. 
381 Id.
382 Id.
383 Id. at 512. 
384 See A Tale of Passion, supra note 371, at 24, 33. 
162 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:093 
successive familial generations.385 Indeed, Perez-Gonzales has 
found that firms where CEO successions run to family members 
(related either by blood or marriage) exhibit systematically lower 
profitability and weaker accounting performance than those 
firms which promote non-familial employees to CEO level.386
Perez-Gonzales attributes this to the negative effect of nepotistic 
(vis-à-vis meritocratic) promotions decisions in effectively buffer-
ing familial CEO appointees from prior disciplining and screening 
by the external market for managerial talent.387 Likewise, 
Bennedsen et al. have found that family firms which permit CEO 
successions to other family members systematically underper-
form (in terms of firm profitability) in relation to those family 
firms where professional non-family managers are appointed as 
successor-CEOs to the founder.388
 From a corporate perspective, moreover, it is questiona-
ble whether the acknowledged business and investor benefits of 
having an autonomous entrepreneurial presence at the first-
generation stage will persist throughout subsequent genera-
tions.389 Empirical studies have shown that, whereas “[in] first 
generation family firms, the presence of the founder is the most 
powerful influence on organisational development ... [t]his founder 
centrality is reduced as the firm moves to the second generation.”390
At the second-generation stage, by contrast, “decision making 
becomes less centralised and personalised” in search of “new 
ways to revitalise and further expand the business.”391 It follows 
that “second-generation CEOs need to develop a more external 
385 Curiously, it has been recorded that two-thirds of family businesses typ-
ically fail to survive beyond the first-generation stage due to succession-related 
difficulties. See Descovich et al., supra note 65, at 60 n.97.  
386 Francisco Pérez-González, Inherited Control and Firm Performance, 96 
AM. ECON. REV. 1559, 1559, 1585 (2006). 
387 Id. at 1560–78, 1585. 
388 See Bennedsen et al., supra note 157, at 649, 669, 689. 
389 Id. at 653. 
390 Cristina Cruz & Mattias Nordqvist, Entrepreneurial Orientation in Family 
Firms: A Generational Perspective, 38 SMALL BUS. ECON. 33, 36 (2012) (citing 
Stéphanie Brun de Ponet et al., An Exploration of the Generational Differences 
in Levels of Control Held Among Family Businesses Approaching Succession,
20 FAM. BUS. REV. 337 (2007)). 
391 Id.
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culture orientation [than founders] that places a greater value on 
signals from the external environment” such as emerging market 
trends and industry characteristics.392 Accordingly, in those lat-
ter instances, it would appear that the abovementioned disparity 
between control and cash flow rights arising from a DCS struc-
ture, and the resultant insulation that this provides from external 
capital market pressures, potentially represents a much more sig-
nificant governance problem than in the case of first-generation 
(founder) firms. 
 It is principally for the above reason that this Article, de-
spite being otherwise supportive of a private ordering approach 
towards DCS structures, would nonetheless caution against em-
bracing an outright deregulatory stance with respect to the issue 
of DCS sunset design. Indeed, whilst—in the present author’s 
view—the above arguments against mandatory time-based sunsets 
remain compelling, there nonetheless remains a reasonable case 
for engendering the adoption of succession- or general transfer-
based sunset provisions over perpetual DCS structures, especially 
in the family firm context.393
 Accordingly, the present author would respectfully suggest 
that the SEC and principal domestic exchanges give serious 
consideration to adopting the transfer-centered model of sunset 
regulation that has recently been implemented by the Hong Kong 
and Singaporean exchanges, as a more moderate alternative to 
the CII’s proposed time-based scheme.394 The advantage of the 
former approach to sunset regulation is that, unlike the time-based 
model, it preserves a firm’s contractual freedom over matters of 
392 Id. Indeed, external environmental signals of this nature would appear 
to be a pertinent factor in engendering “entrepreneurial alertness” in second-
generation familial controllers, which the economist Israel Kirzner has defined 
as the propensity to identify and respond to market disequilibria via so-called 
“frame-breaking”: that is, identifying novel or contrarian strategies that entail 
departing from existing organizational thought frameworks. ISRAEL M. KIRZNER,
PERCEPTION, OPPORTUNITY, AND PROFIT 148 (1979).; see also Connie Marie 
Gaglio & Jerome A. Katz, The Psychological Basis of Opportunity Identification: 
Entrepreneurial Alertness, 16 SMALL BUS. ECON. 95, 99–100, 104 (2001) (citing 
ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS 56 (1985)). 
393 See Cruz & Nordqvist, supra note 390, at 33. 
394 See Sharfman, supra note 4, at 3–4. 
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DCS design insofar as its multi-vote shares (together with the 
economic interest therein) remain in the possession of their 
original holder.395 However, in contrast to the pure private or-
dering approach to sunset design, the transfer-centered model 
insures against the risk of a business founder’s diverse moti-
vations and capabilities failing to transmit to her familial or 
other successors.396 Relatedly, the transfer-centered model 
(unlike the pure private ordering approach to sunset design) is 
sensitive to the unique strategic and governance challenges faced by 
entrepreneurial firms on the death or retirement of their founder, 
which give cause to question the utility of continually entrenching 
second- and successive-generation controllers against outside 
challenge.397
 Accordingly, it is this Article’s contention that the case for 
consolidating founder-familial control across generational lines 
is insufficiently convincing to justify permitting DCS structures 
in perpetuity. At the same time, though, the present author ac-
knowledges the significant sensitivity and context-dependency 
of the various market and behavioral factors at play in this area, 
and the fact that the surrounding academic and policy debate on 
DCS sunset design remains at a somewhat formative stage. 
Against this background, there is arguably something to be said 
for the suggestion that policymakers in the United States should 
continue to put their trust in private ordering as a prospective 
means of bringing about effective (self-) regulatory responses to 
the above concerns, unless and until the case for affirmative 
regulatory interventionism in this regard has been unequivocally 
made out.398
395 Id. at 33–34. 
396 A transfer-based sunset provision ordinarily achieves this outcome in practice 
by preventing multiple-vote shares from passing prematurely to heirs or other 
transferees without the prior authorization of non-controlling shareholders. See 
Descovich et al., supra note 65, at 60. 
397 See Sharfman, Sunsets, supra note 97, at 10. 
398 In this regard, Sharfman envisages that “[i]f the market is concerned 
about dual class share structures creating family dynasties, then it will at least 
include an event-based sunset provision such as unification upon the death or 
disability of the controller.” Id.
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CONCLUSION
 The evolving debate on optimal DCS sunset design,399 like the 
debate on the relative merits of dual- versus single-class stock more 
generally,400 is unlikely to recede any time soon. It is reasonable 
to expect that, over the coming years, further entrepreneurially 
led e-commerce, social media and other tech-sector businesses 
will turn to public equity markets as a source of vital growth fi-
nance.401 At the same time, the heightening specter of hedge 
funds and other activist shareholders in corporate governance 
will no doubt continue to provoke caution on the part of business 
founders about surrendering their control rights to prospective 
outside insurgents.402
 As more and more companies and investor groups come to 
battle with these thorny issues—not just in the United States but 
globally—it is imperative that policymakers everywhere remain 
alert to the potential need for appropriate responses. At the same 
time, given the complexity and firm-specificity of many of the fac-
tors involved in the question of DCS sunset design, regulators must 
resist the temptation to impose overly hasty or blunt “solutions” 
to the perceived problems at hand. The inconvenient reality is 
that, with such polar interests and ideologies at play, any respon-
sive action (or inaction) in this regard will almost certainly alien-
ate one constituency or another. 
 Against the above background, this Article has sought to 
demonstrate that the transfer-centered sunset model recently im-
plemented (in differing ways) by the Hong Kong and Singaporean 
listing authorities is, all things considered, the presumptively 
best—or, more accurately, least worst—of the principal available 
models in terms of striking an effective balance between the two 
core conflicting concerns at play.403 These are, on the one hand, 
preserving scope for private ordering of DCS structures (or other-
wise) at the individual firm level; while, on the other hand, 
399 See Winden & Baker, supra note 24, at 8–9. 
400 Id.
401 See Descovich et al., supra note 65, at 1, 33–34, 37; Goshen & Squire,
supra note 101, at 807. 
402 Goshen & Squire, supra note 101, at 821. 
403 See Descovich et al., supra note 65, at 50–51. 
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protecting companies and non-controlling minority shareholders 
from the most worrying potential misuses of those structures.404
While transfer-based sunsets are by no means immune from crit-
icism themselves, it is the present author’s contention that they 
are overall preferable to time-based sunsets in terms of moderat-
ing the above trade-off.405 This is especially so if recent proposals 
to regulate the matter of DCS sunset design406 are to be given 
serious consideration by policymakers. 
 For the foregoing reasons, it is therefore submitted that the 
SEC and main domestic market authorities should continue to resist 
calls from influential investor-related bodies for the introduction 
of mandatory time-based sunsets. For constructive inspiration in 
this regard, U.S. policymakers should look to Asia rather than at 
home, taking the recent Hong Kong and Singaporean market re-
forms as illustrative examples of best practice.407 At the same 
time, pending the development of a broader consensus on the mer-
its of regulating the matter of DCS sunset design in general, there 
is an arguable case for permitting private ordering to prevail in 
this area for the immediate time being.408
 As the mixed history of previous reactive securities law re-
forms has demonstrated,409 there is much truth in the age-old ad-
age about fools rushing in where angels fear to tread. By the same 
token, when it comes to regulatory responsiveness to salient pol-
icy concerns the early bird seldom catches the worm, or at least 
the one they happened to be looking for at the time. 
404 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 607, 618. 
405 See supra text accompanying notes 393–97. 
406 See Winden & Baker, supra note 24, at 10–11. 
407 See SGX Mainboard Rules, supra note 28, at 10; HK LISTING RULES,
supra note 274, at 8A-5, 8A-7; Descovich et al., supra note 65, at 50. 
408 See Sharfman, Sunsets, supra note 97, at 2–3, 6, 8. 
409 See Descovich et al., supra note 65, at 92.  
